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object； but I have the thing practically in my power and at my
disposal； which is a conception of possession realized by the
understanding and independent of relations of space； and it is mine；
because my will； in determining itself to any particular use of it； is
not in conflict with the law of external freedom。 Now it is just in
abstraction from physical possession of the object of my free…will
in the sphere of sense； that the practical reason wills that a
rational possession of it shall be thought； according to
intellectual conceptions which are not empirical； but contain a priori
the conditions of rational possession。 Hence it is in this fact；
that we found the ground of the validity of such a rational conception
of possession possessio noumenon） as a principle of a universally
valid legislation。 For such a legislation is implied and contained
in the expression； 〃This external object is mine；〃 because an
obligation is thereby imposed upon all others in respect of it； who
would otherwise not have been obliged to abstain from the use of
this object。
The mode； then； of having something external to myself as mine；
consists in a specially juridical connection of the will of the
subject with that object； independently of the empirical relations
to it in space and in time； and in accordance with the conception of a
rational possession。 A particular spot on the earth is not
externally mine because I occupy it with my body； for the question
here discussed refers only to my external freedom； and consequently it
affects only the possession of myself； which is not a thing external
to me； and therefore only involves an internal right。 But if I
continue to be in possession of the spot； although I have taken myself
away from it and gone to another place； only under that condition is
my external right concerned in connection with it。 And to make the
continuous possession of this spot by my person a condition of
having it as mine； must either be to assert that it is not possible at
all to have anything external as one's own； which is contrary to the
postulate in SS 2； or to require； in order that this external
possession may be possible； that I shall be in two places at the
same time。 But this amounts to saying that I must be in a place and
also not in it； which is contradictory and absurd。
This position may be applied to the case in which I have accepted
a promise； for my having and possession in respect of what has been
promised become established on the ground of external right。 This
right is not to be annulled by the fact that the promiser having
said at one time； 〃This thing shall be yours；〃 again at a subsequent
time says； 〃My will now is that the thing shall not be yours。〃 In such
relations of rational right； the conditions hold just the same as if
the promiser had； without any interval of time between them； made
the two declarations of his will； 〃This shall be yours；〃 and also
〃This shall not be yours〃； which manifestly contradicts itself。
The same thing holds； in like manner； of the conception of the
juridical possession of a person as belonging to the Having of a
subject； whether it be a wife； a child； or a servant。 The relations of
right involved in a household； and the reciprocal possession of all
its members； are not annulled by the capability of separating from
each other in space； because it is by juridical relations that they
are connected； and the external mine and thine； as in the former
cases； rests entirely upon the assumption of the possibility of a
purely rational possession； without the accompaniment of physical
detention or holding of the object。
Reason is forced to a critique of its juridically practical function
in special reference to the conception of the external mine and thine；
by the antinomy of the propositions enunciated regarding the
possibility of such a form of possession。 For these give rise to an
inevitable dialectic； in which a thesis and an antithesis set up equal
claims to the validity of two conflicting conditions。 Reason is thus
compelled； in its practical function in relation to right… as it was
in its theoretical function… to make a distinction between
possession as a phenomenal appearance presented to the senses； and
that possession which is rational and thinkable only by the
understanding。
Thesis。… The thesis； in this case； is： 〃It is possible to have
something external as mine； although I am not in possession of it。〃
Antithesis。… The antithesis is： 〃It is not possible to have anything
external as mine； if I am not in possession of it。〃
Solution。… The solution is： 〃Both Propositions are true〃； the former
when I mean empirical possession （possessio phaenomenon）； the latter
when I understand by the same term； a purely rational possession
（possessio noumenon）。
But the possibility of a rational possession； and consequently of an
external mine and thine； cannot be comprehended by direct insight； but
must be deduced from the practical reason。 And in this relation it
is specially noteworthy that the practical reason without
intuitional perceptions； and even without requiring such an element
a priori； can extend its range by the mere elimination of empirical
conditions； as justified by the law of freedom； and can thus establish
synthetical propositions a priori。 The proof of this in the
practical connection； as will be shown afterwards； can be adduced in
an analytical manner。
8。 To Have Anything External as One's Own is only Possible
in a Juridical or Civil State of Society under the
Regulation of a Public Legislative Power。
If； by word or deed； I declare my will that some external thing
shall be mine； I make a declaration that every other person is obliged
to abstain from the use of this object of my exercise of will； and
this imposes an obligation which no one would be under； without such a
juridical act on my part。 But the assumption of this act at the same
time involves the admission that I am obliged reciprocally to
observe a similar abstention towards every other in respect of what is
externally theirs； for the obligation in question arises from a
universal rule regulating the external juridical relations。 Hence I am
not obliged to let alone what another person declares to be externally
his； unless every other person likewise secures me by a guarantee that
he will act in relation to what is mine； upon the same principle。 This
guarantee of reciprocal and mutual abstention from what belongs to
others does not require a special juridical act for its establishment；
but is already involved in the conception of an external obligation of
right； on account of the universality and consequently the reciprocity
of the obligatoriness arising from a universal Rule。 Now a single
will； in relation to an external and consequently contingent
possession； cannot serve as a compulsory law for all； because that
would be to do violence to the freedom which is in accordance with
universal laws。 Therefore it is only a will that binds every one；
and as such a common； collective； and authoritative will； that can
furnish a guarantee of security to all。 But the state of men under a
universal； external； and public legislation； conjoined with
authority and power； is called the civil state。 There can therefore be
an external mine and thine only in the civil state of society。
Consequence。… It follows； as a corollary； that； if it is juridically
possible to have an external object as one's own； the individual
subject of possession must be allowed to compel or constrain every
person with whom a dispute as to the mine or thine of such a
possession may arise； to enter along with himself into the relations
of a civil constitution。
9。 There May； However； Be an External Mine and Thine Found as
a Fact in the State of Nature； but it is only Provisory。
Natural right in the state of a civil constitution means the