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the current opinion that one sees and hears coinstantaneously is due
merely to the fact that the intervals of time ＇between the really
successive perceptions of sight and hearing＇ escape observation。 But
this can scarcely be true； nor is it conceivable that any portion of
time should be ＇absolutely＇ imperceptible； or that any should be
absolutely unnoticeable； the truth being that it is possible to
perceive every instant of time。 ＇This is so＇； because； if it is
inconceivable that a person should； while perceiving himself or
aught else in a continuous time； be at any instant unaware of his
own existence； while； obviously； the assumption； that there is in
the time…continuum a time so small as to be absolutely
imperceptible； carries the implication that a person would； during
such time； be unaware of his own existence； as well as of his seeing
and perceiving； ＇this assumption must be false＇。
Again； if there is any magnitude； whether time or thing；
absolutely imperceptible owing to its smallness； it follows that there
would not be either a thing which one perceives； or a time in which
one perceives it； unless in the sense that in some part of the given
time he sees some part of the given thing。 For ＇let there be a line
ab； divided into two parts at g； and let this line represent a whole
object and a corresponding whole time。 Now；＇ if one sees the whole
line； and perceives it during a time which forms one and the same
continuum； only in the sense that he does so in some portion of this
time； let us suppose the part gb； representing a time in which by
supposition he was perceiving nothing； cut off from the whole。 Well；
then； he perceives in a certain part ＇viz。 in the remainder＇ of the
time； or perceives a part ＇viz。 the remainder＇ of the line； after
the fashion in which one sees the whole earth by seeing some given
part of it； or walks in a year by walking in some given part of the
year。 But ＇by hypothesis＇ in the part bg he perceives nothing：
therefore； in fact； he is said to perceive the whole object and during
the whole time simply because he perceives ＇some part of the object＇
in some part of the time ab。 But the same argument holds also in the
case of ag ＇the remainder； regarded in its turn as a whole＇； for it
will be found ＇on this theory of vacant times and imperceptible
magnitudes＇ that one always perceives only in some part of a given
whole time； and perceives only some part of a whole magnitude； and
that it is impossible to perceive any ＇really＇ whole ＇object in a
really whole time； a conclusion which is absurd； as it would logically
annihilate the perception of both Objects and Time＇。
Therefore we must conclude that all magnitudes are perceptible；
but their actual dimensions do not present themselves immediately in
their presentation as objects。 One sees the sun； or a four…cubit rod
at a distance； as a magnitude； but their exact dimensions are not
given in their visual presentation： nay； at times an object of sight
appears indivisible； but ＇vision like other special senses； is
fallible respecting 'common sensibles'； e。g。 magnitude； and＇ nothing
that one sees is really indivisible。 The reason of this has been
previously explained。 It is clear then； from the above arguments； that
no portion of time is imperceptible。
But we must here return to the question proposed above for
discussion； whether it is possible or impossible to perceive several
objects coinstantaneously； by 'coinstantaneously' I mean perceiving
the several objects in a time one and indivisible relatively to one
another； i。e。 indivisible in a sense consistent with its being all a
continuum。
First； then； is it conceivable that one should perceive the
different things coinstantaneously； but each with a different part
of the Soul？ Or ＇must we object＇ that； in the first place； to begin
with the objects of one and the same sense； e。g。 Sight； if we assume
it ＇the Soul qua exercising Sight＇ to perceive one colour with one
part； and another colour with a different part； it will have a
plurality of parts the same in species； ＇as they must be；＇ since the
objects which it thus perceives fall within the same genus？
Should any one ＇to illustrate how the Soul might have in it two
different parts specifically identical； each directed to a set of
aistheta the same in genus with that to which the other is directed＇
urge that； as there are two eyes； so there may be in the Soul
something analogous； ＇the reply is＇ that of the eyes； doubtless；
some one organ is formed； and hence their actualization in
perception is one； but if this is so in the Soul； then； in so far as
what is formed of both ＇i。e。 of any two specifically identical parts
as assumed＇ is one； the true perceiving subject also will be one； ＇and
the contradictory of the above hypothesis （of different parts of
Soul remaining engaged in simultaneous perception with one sense） is
what emerges from the analogy＇； while if the two parts of Soul
remain separate； the analogy of the eyes will fail； ＇for of these some
one is really formed＇。
Furthermore； ＇on the supposition of the need of different parts of
Soul； co…operating in each sense； to discern different objects
coinstantaneously＇； the senses will be each at the same time one and
many； as if we should say that they were each a set of diverse
sciences； for neither will an 'activity' exist without its proper
faculty； nor without activity will there be sensation。
But if the Soul does not； in the way suggested ＇i。e。 with
different parts of itself acting simultaneously＇； perceive in one
and the same individual time sensibles of the same sense； a fortiori
it is not thus that it perceives sensibles of different senses。 For it
is； as already stated； more conceivable that it should perceive a
plurality of the former together in this way than a plurality of
heterogeneous objects。
If then； as is the fact； the Soul with one part perceives Sweet；
with another； White； either that which results from these is some
one part； or else there is no such one resultant。 But there must be
such an one； inasmuch as the general faculty of sense…perception is
one。 What one object； then； does that one faculty ＇when perceiving
an object； e。g。 as both White and Sweet＇ perceive？ ＇None＇； for
assuredly no one object arises by composition of these
＇heterogeneous objects； such as White and Sweet＇。 We must conclude；
therefore； that there is； as has been stated before； some one
faculty in the soul with which the latter perceives all its
percepts； though it perceives each different genus of sensibles
through a different organ。
May we not； then； conceive this faculty which perceives White and
Sweet to be one qua indivisible ＇sc。 qua combining its different
simultaneous objects＇ in its actualization； but different； when it has
become divisible ＇sc。 qua distinguishing its different simultaneous
objects＇ in its actualization？
Or is what occurs in the case of the perceiving Soul conceivably
analogous to what holds true in that of the things themselves？ For the
same numerically one thing is white and sweet； and has many other
qualities； ＇while its numerical oneness is not thereby prejudiced＇
if the fact is not that the qualities are really separable in the
object from one another； but that the being of each quality is
different ＇from that of every other＇。 In the same way therefore we
must assume also； in the case of the Soul； that the faculty of
perception in general is in itself numerically one and the same； but
different ＇differentiated＇ in its being； different； that is to say； in
genus as regards some of its objects； in species as regards others。
Hence too； we may conclude that one can perceive ＇numerically
diff