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discern two objects coinstantaneously in the same individual time？ The
above assumption explains why persons do not perceive what is
brought before their eyes； if they are at the time deep in thought； or
in a fright； or listening to some loud noise。 This assumption； then；
must be made； and also the following： that it is easier to discern
each object of sense when in its simple form than when an ingredient
in a mixture； easier； for example； to discern wine when neat than when
blended； and so also honey； and ＇in other provinces＇ a colour； or to
discern the nete by itself alone； than ＇when sounded with the
hypate＇ in the octave； the reason being that component elements tend
to efface ＇the distinctive characteristics of＇ one another。 Such is
the effect ＇on one another＇ of all ingredients of which； when
compounded； some one thing is formed。
If； then； the greater stimulus tends to expel the less； it
necessarily follows that； when they concur； this greater should itself
too be less distinctly perceptible than if it were alone； since the
less by blending with it has removed some of its individuality；
according to our assumption that simple objects are in all cases
more distinctly perceptible。
Now； if the two stimuli are equal but heterogeneous； no perception
of either will ensue； they will alike efface one another's
characteristics。 But in such a case the perception of either
stimulus in its simple form is impossible。 Hence either there will
then be no sense…perception at all； or there will be a perception
compounded of both and differing from either。 The latter is what
actually seems to result from ingredients blended together； whatever
may be the compound in which they are so mixed。
Since； then； from some concurrent ＇sensory stimuli＇ a resultant
object is produced； while from others no such resultant is produced；
and of the latter sort are those things which belong to different
sense provinces （for only those things are capable of mixture whose
extremes are contraries； and no one compound can be formed from；
e。g。 White and Sharp； except indirectly； i。e。 not as a concord is
formed of Sharp and Grave）； there follows logically the
impossibility of discerning such concurrent stimuli coinstantaneously。
For we must suppose that the stimuli； when equal； tend alike to efface
one another； since no one ＇form of stimulus＇ results from them； while；
if they are unequal； the stronger alone is distinctly perceptible。
Again； the soul would be more likely to perceive
coinstantaneously； with one and the same sensory act； two things in
the same sensory province； such as the Grave and the Sharp in sound；
for the sensory stimulation in this one province is more likely to
be unitemporal than that involving two different provinces； as Sight
and Hearing。 But it is impossible to perceive two objects
coinstantaneously in the same sensory act unless they have been mixed；
＇when； however； they are no longer two＇； for their amalgamation
involves their becoming one； and the sensory act related to one object
is itself one； and such act； when one； is； of course；
coinstantaneous with itself。 Hence； when things are mixed we of
necessity perceive them coinstantaneously： for we perceive them by a
perception actually one。 For an object numerically one means that
which is perceived by a perception actually one； whereas an object
specifically one means that which is perceived by a sensory act
potentially one ＇i。e。 by an energeia of the same sensuous faculty＇。 If
then the actualized perception is one； it will declare its data to
be one object； they must； therefore； have been mixed。 Accordingly；
when they have not been mixed； the actualized perceptions which
perceive them will be two； but ＇if so； their perception must be
successive not coinstantaneous； for＇ in one and the same faculty the
perception actualized at any single moment is necessarily one； only
one stimulation or exertion of a single faculty being possible at a
single instant； and in the case supposed here the faculty is one。 It
follows； therefore； that we cannot conceive the possibility of
perceiving two distinct objects coinstantaneously with one and the
same sense。
But if it be thus impossible to perceive coinstantaneously two
objects in the same province of sense if they are really two；
manifestly it is still less conceivable that we should perceive
coinstantaneously objects in two different sensory provinces； as White
and Sweet。 For it appears that when the Soul predicates numerical
unity it does so in virtue of nothing else than such coinstantaneous
perception ＇of one object； in one instant； by one energeia＇： while
it predicates specific unity in virtue of ＇the unity of＇ the
discriminating faculty of sense together with ＇the unity of＇ the
mode in which this operates。 What I mean； for example； is this； the
same sense no doubt discerns White and Black； ＇which are hence
generically one＇ though specifically different from one another； and
so； too； a faculty of sense self…identical； but different from the
former； discerns Sweet and Bitter； but while both these faculties
differ from one another ＇and each from itself＇ in their modes of
discerning either of their respective contraries； yet in perceiving
the co…ordinates in each province they proceed in manners analogous to
one another； for instance； as Taste perceives Sweet； so Sight
perceives White； and as the latter perceives Black； so the former
perceives Bitter。
Again； if the stimuli of sense derived from Contraries are
themselves Contrary； and if Contraries cannot be conceived as
subsisting together in the same individual subject； and if Contraries；
e。g。 Sweet and Bitter； come under one and the same sense…faculty； we
must conclude that it is impossible to discern them coinstantaneously。
It is likewise clearly impossible so to discern such homogeneous
sensibles as are not ＇indeed＇ Contrary； ＇but are yet of different
species＇。 For these are； ＇in the sphere of colour； for instance＇；
classed some with White； others with Black； and so it is； likewise； in
the other provinces of sense； for example； of savours； some are
classed with Sweet； and others with Bitter。 Nor can one discern the
components in compounds coinstantaneously （for these are ratios of
Contraries； as e。g。 the Octave or the Fifth）； unless； indeed； on
condition of perceiving them as one。 For thus； and not otherwise；
the ratios of the extreme sounds are compounded into one ratio：
since we should have together the ratio； on the one hand； of Many to
Few or of Odd to Even； on the other； that of Few to Many or of Even to
Odd ＇and these； to be perceived together； must be unified＇。
If； then； the sensibles denominated co…ordinates though in different
provinces of sense （e。g。 I call Sweet and White co…ordinates though in
different provinces） stand yet more aloof； and differ more； from one
another than do any sensibles in the same province； while Sweet
differs from White even more than Black does from White； it is still
less conceivable that one should discern them ＇viz。 sensibles in
different sensory provinces whether co…ordinates or not＇
coinstantaneously than sensibles which are in the same province。
Therefore； if coinstantaneous perception of the latter be
impossible； that of the former is a fortiori impossible。
Some of the writers who treat of concords assert that the sounds
combined in these do not reach us simultaneously； but only appear to
do so； their real successiveness being unnoticed whenever the time
it involves is ＇so small as to be＇ imperceptible。 Is this true or not？
One might perhaps； following this up； go so far as to say that even
the current opinion that one sees and hears coinstantaneously is due
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