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o accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures； since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity。 What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains； or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations； except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both？ Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous； and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure。 What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain； except the feelings and judgment of the experienced？ When； therefore； those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind； apart from the question of intensity； to those of which the animal nature； disjoined from the higher faculties； is suspectible； they are entitled on this subject to the same regard。 I have dwelt on this point； as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness； considered as the directive rule of human conduct。 But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard； for that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness； but the greatest amount of happiness altogether； and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness； there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier； and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it。 Utilitarianism； therefore； could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character； even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others； and his own； so far as happiness is concerned； were a sheer deduction from the benefit。 But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last； renders refutation superfluous。
According to the Greatest Happiness Principle； as above explained； the ultimate end； with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable （whether we are considering our own good or that of other people）； is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain； and as rich as possible in enjoyments； both in point of quantity and quality； the test of quality； and the rule for measuring it against quantity； being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience； to which must be added their habits of self…consciousness and self…observation； are best furnished with the means of comparison。 This； being； according to the utilitarian opinion； the end of human action； is necessarily also the standard of morality； which may accordingly be defined； the rules and precepts for human conduct； by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be； to the greatest extent possible； secured to all mankind； and not to them only； but； so far as the nature of things admits； to the whole sentient creation。 Against this doctrine； however； arises another class of objectors； who say that happiness； in any form； cannot be the rational purpose of human life and action； because； in the first place； it is unattainable： and they contemptuously ask； what right hast thou to be happy？ a question which Mr。 Carlyle clenches by the addition； What right； a short time ago； hadst thou even to be？ Next； they say； that men can do without happiness； that all noble human beings have felt this； and could not have become noble but by learning the lesson of Entsagen； or renunciation； which lesson； thoroughly learnt and submitted to； they affirm to be the beginning and necessary condition of all virtue。 The first of these objections would go to the root of the matter were it well founded； for if no happiness is to be had at all by human beings； the attainment of it cannot be the end of morality； or of any rational conduct。 Though； even in that case； something might still be said for the utilitarian theory； since utility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness； but the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness； and if the former aim be chimerical； there will be all the greater scope and more imperative need for the latter； so long at least as mankind think fit to live； and do not take refuge in the simultaneous act of suicide recommended under certain conditions by Novalis。 When； however； it is thus positively asserted to be impossible that human life should be happy； the assertion； if not something like a verbal quibble； is at least an exaggeration。 If by happiness be meant a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement； it is evident enough that this is impossible。 A state of exalted pleasure lasts only moments； or in some cases； and with some intermissions； hours or days； and is the occasional brilliant flash of enjoyment； not its permanent and steady flame。 Of this the philosophers who have taught that happiness is the end of life were as fully aware as those who taunt them。 The happiness which they meant was not a life of rapture； but moments of such； in an existence made up of few and transitory pains； many and various pleasures； with a decided predominance of the active over the passive； and having as the foundation of the whole； not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing。 A life thus composed； to those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it； has always appeared worthy of the name of happiness。 And such an existence is even now the lot of many； during some considerable portion of their lives。 The present wretched education； and wretched social arrangements； are the only real hindrance to its being attainable by almost all。 The objectors perhaps may doubt whether human beings； if taught to consider happiness as the end of life； would be satisfied with such a moderate share of it。 But great numbers of mankind have been satisfied with much less。 The main constituents of a satisfied life appear to be two； either of which by itself is often found sufficient for the purpose： tranquillity； and excitement。 With much tranquillity； many find that they can be content with very little pleasure： with much excitement； many can reconcile themselves to a considerable quantity of pain。 There is assuredly no inherent impossibility in enabling even the mass of mankind to unite both； since the two are so far from being incompatible that they are in natural alliance； the prolongation of either being a preparation for； and exciting a wish for； the other。 It is only those in whom indolence amounts to a vice； that do not desire excitement after an interval of repose： it is only those in whom the need of excitement is a disease； that feel the tranquillity which follows excitement dull and insipid； instead of pleasurable in direct proportion to the excitement which preceded it。 When people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make it valuable to them； the cause generally is； caring for nobody but themselves。 To those who have neither public nor private affections； the excitements of life are much curtailed； and in any case dwindle in value as the time approaches when all selfish interests must be terminated by death： while those who leave after them objects of personal affection； and especially those who have also cultivated a fellow…feeling with the collective interests of mankind； retain as lively an interest in life on the eve of death as in the vigour of youth and health。 Next to selfishness； the principal cause which makes life unsatisfactory is want of mental cultivation。 A cultivated mind… I do not mean that of a philosopher； but any mind to which the fountains of knowledge have been opened； and which has been taught； in any tolerable degree； to exercise its faculties… finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it； in the objects of nature； the achievements of art； the imaginations of poetry； the incidents of history； the ways of mankind； past and present； and their prospects in the future。 It is possible； indeed； to become indifferent to all this； and that too without having exhausted a thousandth part of it； but only when one has had from the beginning no moral or human interest in these things； and has sought in them only the gratification of curiosity。 Now there is absolutely no reason in the nature of things why a