utilitarianism-第3章

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hat　of　beasts　is　felt　as　degrading；　precisely　because　a　beast's　pleasures　do　not　satisfy　a　human　being's　conceptions　of　happiness。　Human　beings　have　faculties　more　elevated　than　the　animal　appetites；　and　when　once　made　conscious　of　them；　do　not　regard　anything　as　happiness　which　does　not　include　their　gratification。　I　do　not；　indeed；　consider　the　Epicureans　to　have　been　by　any　means　faultless　in　drawing　out　their　scheme　of　consequences　from　the　utilitarian　principle。　To　do　this　in　any　sufficient　manner；　many　Stoic；　as　well　as　Christian　elements　require　to　be　included。　But　there　is　no　known　Epicurean　theory　of　life　which　does　not　assign　to　the　pleasures　of　the　intellect；　of　the　feelings　and　imagination；　and　of　the　moral　sentiments；　a　much　higher　value　as　pleasures　than　to　those　of　mere　sensation。　It　must　be　admitted；　however；　that　utilitarian　writers　in　general　have　placed　the　superiority　of　mental　over　bodily　pleasures　chiefly　in　the　greater　permanency；　safety；　uncostliness；　etc。；　of　the　former…　that　is；　in　their　circumstantial　advantages　rather　than　in　their　intrinsic　nature。　And　on　all　these　points　utilitarians　have　fully　proved　their　case；　but　they　might　have　taken　the　other；　and；　as　it　may　be　called；　higher　ground；　with　entire　consistency。　It　is　quite　compatible　with　the　principle　of　utility　to　recognise　the　fact；　that　some　kinds　of　pleasure　are　more　desirable　and　more　valuable　than　others。　It　would　be　absurd　that　while；　in　estimating　all　other　things；　quality　is　considered　as　well　as　quantity；　the　estimation　of　pleasures　should　be　supposed　to　depend　on　quantity　alone。　　　If　I　am　asked；　what　I　mean　by　difference　of　quality　in　pleasures；　or　what　makes　one　pleasure　more　valuable　than　another；　merely　as　a　pleasure；　except　its　being　greater　in　amount；　there　is　but　one　possible　answer。　Of　two　pleasures；　if　there　be　one　to　which　all　or　almost　all　who　have　experience　of　both　give　a　decided　preference；　irrespective　of　any　feeling　of　moral　obligation　to　prefer　it；　that　is　the　more　desirable　pleasure。　If　one　of　the　two　is；　by　those　who　are　competently　acquainted　with　both；　placed　so　far　above　the　other　that　they　prefer　it；　even　though　knowing　it　to　be　attended　with　a　greater　amount　of　discontent；　and　would　not　resign　it　for　any　quantity　of　the　other　pleasure　which　their　nature　is　capable　of；　we　are　justified　in　ascribing　to　the　preferred　enjoyment　a　superiority　in　quality；　so　far　outweighing　quantity　as　to　render　it；　in　comparison；　of　small　account。　　　Now　it　is　an　unquestionable　fact　that　those　who　are　equally　acquainted　with；　and　equally　capable　of　appreciating　and　enjoying；　both；　do　give　a　most　marked　preference　to　the　manner　of　existence　which　employs　their　higher　faculties。　Few　human　creatures　would　consent　to　be　changed　into　any　of　the　lower　animals；　for　a　promise　of　the　fullest　allowance　of　a　beast's　pleasures；　no　intelligent　human　being　would　consent　to　be　a　fool；　no　instructed　person　would　be　an　ignoramus；　no　person　of　feeling　and　conscience　would　be　selfish　and　base；　even　though　they　should　be　persuaded　that　the　fool；　the　dunce；　or　the　rascal　is　better　satisfied　with　his　lot　than　they　are　with　theirs。　They　would　not　resign　what　they　possess　more　than　he　for　the　most　complete　satisfaction　of　all　the　desires　which　they　have　in　common　with　him。　If　they　ever　fancy　they　would；　it　is　only　in　cases　of　unhappiness　so　extreme；　that　to　escape　from　it　they　would　exchange　their　lot　for　almost　any　other；　however　undesirable　in　their　own　eyes。　A　being　of　higher　faculties　requires　more　to　make　him　happy；　is　capable　probably　of　more　acute　suffering；　and　certainly　accessible　to　it　at　more　points；　than　one　of　an　inferior　type；　but　in　spite　of　these　liabilities；　he　can　never　really　wish　to　sink　into　what　he　feels　to　be　a　lower　grade　of　existence。　We　may　give　what　explanation　we　please　of　this　unwillingness；　we　may　attribute　it　to　pride；　a　name　which　is　given　indiscriminately　to　some　of　the　most　and　to　some　of　the　least　estimable　feelings　of　which　mankind　are　capable：　we　may　refer　it　to　the　love　of　liberty　and　personal　independence；　an　appeal　to　which　was　with　the　Stoics　one　of　the　most　effective　means　for　the　inculcation　of　it；　to　the　love　of　power；　or　to　the　love　of　excitement；　both　of　which　do　really　enter　into　and　contribute　to　it：　but　its　most　appropriate　appellation　is　a　sense　of　dignity；　which　all　human　beings　possess　in　one　form　or　other；　and　in　some；　though　by　no　means　in　exact；　proportion　to　their　higher　faculties；　and　which　is　so　essential　a　part　of　the　happiness　of　those　in　whom　it　is　strong；　that　nothing　which　conflicts　with　it　could　be；　otherwise　than　momentarily；　an　object　of　desire　to　them。　　　Whoever　supposes　that　this　preference　takes　place　at　a　sacrifice　of　happiness…　that　the　superior　being；　in　anything　like　equal　circumstances；　is　not　happier　than　the　inferior…　confounds　the　two　very　different　ideas；　of　happiness；　and　content。　It　is　indisputable　that　the　being　whose　capacities　of　enjoyment　are　low；　has　the　greatest　chance　of　having　them　fully　satisfied；　and　a　highly　endowed　being　will　always　feel　that　any　happiness　which　he　can　look　for；　as　the　world　is　constituted；　is　imperfect。　But　he　can　learn　to　bear　its　imperfections；　if　they　are　at　all　bearable；　and　they　will　not　make　him　envy　the　being　who　is　indeed　unconscious　of　the　imperfections；　but　only　because　he　feels　not　at　all　the　good　which　those　imperfections　qualify。　It　is　better　to　be　a　human　being　dissatisfied　than　a　pig　satisfied；　better　to　be　Socrates　dissatisfied　than　a　fool　satisfied。　And　if　the　fool；　or　the　pig；　are　a　different　opinion；　it　is　because　they　only　know　their　own　side　of　the　question。　The　other　party　to　the　comparison　knows　both　sides。　　　It　may　be　objected；　that　many　who　are　capable　of　the　higher　pleasures；　occasionally；　under　the　influence　of　temptation；　postpone　them　to　the　lower。　But　this　is　quite　compatible　with　a　full　appreciation　of　the　intrinsic　superiority　of　the　higher。　Men　often；　from　infirmity　of　character；　make　their　election　for　the　nearer　good；　though　they　know　it　to　be　the　less　valuable；　and　this　no　less　when　the　choice　is　between　two　bodily　pleasures；　than　when　it　is　between　bodily　and　mental。　They　pursue　sensual　indulgences　to　the　injury　of　health；　though　perfectly　aware　that　health　is　the　greater　good。　　　It　may　be　further　objected；　that　many　who　begin　with　youthful　enthusiasm　for　everything　noble；　as　they　advance　in　years　sink　into　indolence　and　selfishness。　But　I　do　not　believe　that　those　who　undergo　this　very　common　change；　voluntarily　choose　the　lower　description　of　pleasures　in　preference　to　the　higher。　I　believe　that　before　they　devote　themselves　exclusively　to　the　one；　they　have　already　become　incapable　of　the　other。　Capacity　for　the　nobler　feelings　is　in　most　natures　a　very　tender　plant；　easily　killed；　not　only　by　hostile　influences；　but　by　mere　want　of　sustenance；　and　in　the　majority　of　young　persons　it　speedily　dies　away　if　the　occupations　to　which　their　position　in　life　has　devoted　them；　and　the　society　into　which　it　has　thrown　them；　are　not　favourable　to　keeping　that　higher　capacity　in　exercise。　Men　lose　their　high　aspirations　as　they　lose　their　intellectual　tastes；　because　they　have　not　time　or　opportunity　for　indulging　them；　and　they　addict　themselves　to　inferior　pleasures；　not　because　they　deliberately　prefer　them；　but　because　they　are　either　the　only　ones　to　which　they　have　access；　or　the　only　ones　which　they　are　any　longer　capable　of　enjoying。　It　may　be　questioned　whether　any　one　who　has　remained　equally　susceptible　to　both　classes　of　pleasures；　ever　knowingly　and　calmly　preferred　the　lower；　though　many；　in　all　ages；　have　broken　down　in　an　ineffectual　attempt　to　combine　both。　　　From　this　verdict　of　the　only　competent　judges；　I　apprehend　there　can　be　no　appeal。　On　a　question　which　is　the　best　worth　having　of　two　pleasures；　or　which　of　two　modes　of　existence　is　the　most　grateful　to　the　feelings；　apart　from　its　moral　attributes　and　from　its　consequences；　the　judgment　of　those　who　are　qualified　by　knowledge　of　both；　or；　if　they　differ；　that　of　the　majority　among　them；　must　be　admitted　as　final。　And　there　needs　be　the　less　hesitation　to　accept　this　judgment　respecting　the　quality　of　pleasures；　since　there　is　no　other　tribunal　to　be　r