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（Jus Civitatis）。
44。 Origin Of the Civil Union and Public Right。
It is not from any experience prior to the appearance of an external
authoritative legislation that we learn of the maxim of natural
violence among men and their evil tendency to engage in war with
each other。 Nor is it assumed here that it is merely some particular
historical condition or fact； that makes public legislative constraint
necessary； for however well…disposed or favourable to right men may be
considered to be of themselves； the rational idea of a state of
society not yet regulated by right； must be taken as our
starting…point。 This idea implies that before a legal state of society
can be publicly established； individual men； nations； and states；
can never be safe against violence from each other； and this is
evident from the consideration that every one of his own will
naturally does what seems good and right in his own eyes； entirely
independent of the opinion of others。 Hence； unless the institution of
right is to be renounced； the first thing incumbent on men is to
accept the principle that it is necessary to leave the state of
nature； in which every one follows his own inclinations； and to form a
union of all those who cannot avoid coming into reciprocal
communication； and thus subject themselves in common to the external
restraint of public compulsory laws。 Men thus enter into a civil
union； in which every one has it determined by law what shall be
recognized as his； and this is secured to him by a competent
external power distinct from his own individuality。 Such is the
primary obligation； on the part of all men； to enter into the
relations of a civil state of society。
The natural condition of mankind need not； on this ground； be
represented as a state of absolute injustice； as if there could have
been no other relation originally among men but what was merely
determined by force。 But this natural condition must be regarded； if
it ever existed； as a state of society that was void of regulation
by right （status justitiae vacuus）； so that if a matter of right
came to be in dispute （jus controversum）； no competent judge was found
to give an authorized legal decision upon it。 It is therefore
reasonable that any one should constrain another by force； to pass
from such a nonjuridical state of life and enter within the
jurisdiction of a civil state of society。 For； although on the basis
of the ideas of right held by individuals as such； external things may
be acquired by occupancy or contract； yet such acquisition is only
provisory so long as it has not yet obtained the sanction of a
public law。 Till this sanction is reached； the condition of possession
is not determined by any public distributive justice； nor is it
secured by any power exercising public right。
If men were not disposed to recognize any acquisition at all as
rightful… even in a provisional way… prior to entering into the
civil state； this state of society would itself be impossible。 For the
laws regarding the mine and thine in the state of nature； contain
formally the very same thing as they prescribe in the civil state；
when it is viewed merely according to rational conceptions： only
that in the forms of the civil state the conditions are laid down
under which the formal prescriptions of the state of nature attain
realization conformable to distributive justice。 Were there； then； not
even provisionally； an external meum and tuum in the state of
nature； neither would there be any juridical duties in relation to
them； and； consequently； there would be no obligation to pass out of
that state into another。
45。 The Form of the State and its Three Powers。
A state （civitas） is the union of a number of men under juridical
laws。 These laws； as such； are to be regarded as necessary a priori…
that is； as following of themselves from the conceptions of external
right generally… and not as merely established by statute。 The form of
the state is thus involved in the idea of the state； viewed as it
ought to be according to pure principles of right； and this ideal form
furnishes the normal criterion of every real union that constitutes
a commonwealth。
Every state contains in itself three powers； the universal united
will of the people being thus personified in a political triad。
These are the legislative power； the executive power； and the
judiciary power。 1。 The legislative power of the sovereignty in the
state is embodied in the person of the lawgiver； 2。 the executive
power is embodied in the person of the ruler who administers the
Law； and 3。 the judiciary power； embodied in the person of the
judge； is the function of assigning every one what is his own；
according to the law （potestas legislatoria； rectoria； et judiciaria）。
These three powers may be compared to the three propositions in a
practical syllogism： the major as the sumption laying down the
universal law of a will； the minor presenting the command applicable
to an action according to the law as the principle of the subsumption；
and the conclusion containing the sentence； or judgement of right；
in the particular case under consideration。
46。 The Legislative Power and the Members of the State。
The legislative power； viewed in its rational principle； can only
belong to the united will of the people。 For； as all right ought to
proceed from this power； it is necessary that its laws should be
unable to do wrong to any one whatever。 Now； if any one individual
determines anything in the state in contradistinction to another； it
is always possible that he may perpetrate a wrong on that other； but
this is never possible when all determine and decree what is to be Law
to themselves。 Volenti non fit injuria。 Hence it is only the united
and consenting will of all the people… in so far as each of them
determines the same thing about all； and all determine the same
thing about each… that ought to have the power of enacting law in
the state。
The members of a civil society thus united for the purpose of
legislation； and thereby constituting a state； are called its
citizens； and there are three juridical attributes that inseparably
belong to them by right。 These are： 1。 constitutional freedom； as
the right of every citizen to have to obey no other law than that to
which he has given his consent or approval； 2。 civil equality； as
the right of the citizen to recognise no one as a superior among the
people in relation to himself； except in so far as such a one is as
subject to his moral power to impose obligations； as that other has
power to impose obligations upon him； and 3。 political independence；
as the light to owe his existence and continuance in society not to
the arbitrary will of another； but to his own rights and powers as a
member of the commonwealth； and； consequently； the possession of a
civil personality； which cannot be represented by any other than
himself。
The capability of voting by possession of the suffrage properly
constitutes the political qualification of a citizen as a member of
the state。 But this； again； presupposes the independence or
self…sufficiency of the individual citizen among the people； as one
who is not a mere incidental part of the commonwealth； but a member of
it acting of his own will in community with others。 The last of the
three qualities involved necessarily constitutes the distinction
between active and passive citizenship； although the latter conception
appears to stand in contradiction to the definition of a citizen as
such。 The following examples may serve to remove this difficulty。
The apprentice of a merchant or tradesman； a servant who is not in the
employ of the state； a minor （naturaliter vel civiliter）； all women；
and； generally； every one who is compelled to maintain himself not
according to his own industry； but as it is arranged by others （the
state except