gorgias-第8章

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ot　admit　a　word　which　you　have　been　saying。　　　Pol。　That　is　because　you　will　not；　for　you　surely　must　think　as　I　do。　　　Soc。　Not　so；　my　simple　friend；　but　because　you　will　refute　me　after　the　manner　which　rhetoricians　practise　in　courts　of　law。　For　there　the　one　party　think　that　they　refute　the　other　when　they　bring　forward　a　number　of　witnesses　of　good　repute　in　proof　of　their　allegations；　and　their　adversary　has　only　a　single　one　or　none　at　all。　But　this　kind　of　proof　is　of　no　value　where　truth　is　the　aim；　a　man　may　often　be　sworn　down　by　a　multitude　of　false　witnesses　who　have　a　great　air　of　respectability。　And　in　this　argument　nearly　every　one；　Athenian　and　stranger　alike；　would　be　on　your　side；　if　you　should　bring　witnesses　in　disproof　of　my　statement…you　may；　if　you　will；　summon　Nicias　the　son　of　Niceratus；　and　let　his　brothers；　who　gave　the　row　of　tripods　which　stand　in　the　precincts　of　Dionysus；　come　with　him；　or　you　may　summon　Aristocrates；　the　son　of　Scellius；　who　is　the　giver　of　that　famous　offering　which　is　at　Delphi；　summon；　if　you　will；　the　whole　house　of　Pericles；　or　any　other　great　Athenian　family　whom　you　choose…they　will　all　agree　with　you：　I　only　am　left　alone　and　cannot　agree；　for　you　do　not　convince　me；　although　you　produce　many　false　witnesses　against　me；　in　the　hope　of　depriving　me　of　my　inheritance；　which　is　the　truth。　But　I　consider　that　nothing　worth　speaking　of　will　have　been　effected　by　me　unless　I　make　you　the　one　witness　of　my　words；　nor　by　you；　unless　you　make　me　the　one　witness　of　yours；　no　matter　about　the　rest　of　the　world。　For　there　are　two　ways　of　refutation；　one　which　is　yours　and　that　of　the　world　in　general；　but　mine　is　of　another　sort…let　us　compare　them；　and　see　in　what　they　differ。　For；　indeed；　we　are　at　issue　about　matters　which　to　know　is　honourable　and　not　to　know　disgraceful；　to　know　or　not　to　know　happiness　and　misery…that　is　the　chief　of　them。　And　what　knowledge　can　be　nobler？　or　what　ignorance　more　disgraceful　than　this？　And　therefore　I　will　begin　by　asking　you　whether　you　do　not　think　that　a　man　who　is　unjust　and　doing　injustice　can　be　happy；　seeing　that　you　think　Archelaus　unjust；　and　yet　happy？　May　I　assume　this　to　be　your　opinion？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　But　I　say　that　this　is　an　impossibility…here　is　one　point　about　which　we　are　at　issue：…very　good。　And　do　you　mean　to　say　also　that　if　he　meets　with　retribution　and　punishment　he　will　still　be　happy？　　　Pol。　Certainly　not；　in　that　case　he　will　be　most　miserable。　　　Soc。　On　the　other　hand；　if　the　unjust　be　not　punished；　then；　according　to　you；　he　will　be　happy？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　But　in　my　opinion；　Polus；　the　unjust　or　doer　of　unjust　actions　is　miserable　in　any　case；…more　miserable；　however；　if　he　be　not　punished　and　does　not　meet　with　retribution；　and　less　miserable　if　he　be　punished　and　meets　with　retribution　at　the　hands　of　gods　and　men。　　　Pol。　You　are　maintaining　a　strange　doctrine；　Socrates。　　　Soc。　I　shall　try　to　make　you　agree　with　me；　O　my　friend；　for　as　a　friend　I　regard　you。　Then　these　are　the　points　at　issue　between　us…are　they　not？　I　was　saying　that　to　do　is　worse　than　to　suffer　injustice？　　　Pol。　Exactly　so。　　　Soc。　And　you　said　the　opposite？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　I　said　also　that　the　wicked　are　miserable；　and　you　refuted　me？　　　Pol。　By　Zeus；　I　did。　　　Soc。　In　your　own　opinion；　Polus。　　　Pol。　Yes；　and　I　rather　suspect　that　I　was　in　the　right。　　　Soc。　You　further　said　that　the　wrong…doer　is　happy　if　he　be　unpunished？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　I　affirm　that　he　is　most　miserable；　and　that　those　who　are　punished　are　less　miserable…are　you　going　to　refute　this　proposition　also？　　　Pol。　A　proposition　which　is　harder　of　refutation　than　the　other；　Socrates。　　　Soc。　Say　rather；　Polus；　impossible；　for　who　can　refute　the　truth？　　　Pol。　What　do　you　mean？　If　a　man　is　detected　in　an　unjust　attempt　to　make　himself　a　tyrant；　and　when　detected　is　racked；　mutilated；　has　his　eyes　burned　out；　and　after　having　had　all　sorts　of　great　injuries　inflicted　on　him；　and　having　seen　his　wife　and　children　suffer　the　like；　is　at　last　impaled　or　tarred　and　burned　alive；　will　he　be　happier　than　if　he　escape　and　become　a　tyrant；　and　continue　all　through　life　doing　what　he　likes　and　holding　the　reins　of　government；　the　envy　and　admiration　both　of　citizens　and　strangers？　Is　that　the　paradox　which；　as　you　say；　cannot　be　refuted？　　　Soc。　There　again；　noble　Polus；　you　are　raising　hobgoblins　instead　of　refuting　me；　just　now　you　were　calling　witnesses　against　me。　But　please　to　refresh　my　memory　a　little；　did　you　say…〃in　an　unjust　attempt　to　make　himself　a　tyrant〃？　　　Pol。　Yes；　I　did。　　　Soc。　Then　I　say　that　neither　of　them　will　be　happier　than　the　other…neither　he　who　unjustly　acquires　a　tyranny；　nor　he　who　suffers　in　the　attempt；　for　of　two　miserables　one　cannot　be　the　happier；　but　that　he　who　escapes　and　becomes　a　tyrant　is　the　more　miserable　of　the　two。　Do　you　laugh；　Polus？　Well；　this　is　a　new　kind　of　refutation…when　any　one　says　anything；　instead　of　refuting　him　to　laugh　at　him。　　　Pol。　But　do　you　not　think；　Socrates；　that　you　have　been　sufficiently　refuted；　when　you　say　that　which　no　human　being　will　allow？　Ask　the　company。　　　Soc。　O　Polus；　I　am　not　a　public　man；　and　only　last　year；　when　my　tribe　were　serving　as　Prytanes；　and　it　became　my　duty　as　their　president　to　take　the　votes；　there　was　a　laugh　at　me；　because　I　was　unable　to　take　them。　And　as　I　failed　then；　you　must　not　ask　me　to　count　the　suffrages　of　the　company　now；　but　if；　as　I　was　saying；　you　have　no　better　argument　than　numbers；　let　me　have　a　turn；　and　do　you　make　trial　of　the　sort　of　proof　which；　as　I　think；　is　required；　for　I　shall　produce　one　witness　only　of　the　truth　of　my　words；　and　he　is　the　person　with　whom　I　am　arguing；　his　suffrage　I　know　how　to　take；　but　with　the　many　I　have　nothing　to　do；　and　do　not　even　address　myself　to　them。　May　I　ask　then　whether　you　will　answer　in　turn　and　have　your　words　put　to　the　proof？　For　I　certainly　think　that　I　and　you　and　every　man　do　really　believe；　that　to　do　is　a　greater　evil　than　to　suffer　injustice：　and　not　to　be　punished　than　to　be　punished。　　　Pol。　And　I　should　say　neither　I；　nor　any　man：　would　you　yourself；　for　example；　suffer　rather　than　do　injustice？　　　Soc。　Yes；　and　you；　too；　I　or　any　man　would。　　　Pol。　Quite　the　reverse；　neither　you；　nor　I；　nor　any　man。　　　Soc。　But　will　you　answer？　　　Pol。　To　be　sure；　I　will…for　I　am　curious　to　hear　what　you　can　have　to　say。　　　Soc。　Tell　me；　then；　and　you　will　know；　and　let　us　suppose　that　I　am　beginning　at　the　beginning：　which　of　the　two；　Polus；　in　your　opinion；　is　the　worst？…to　do　injustice　or　to　suffer？　　　Pol。　I　should　say　that　suffering　was　worst。　　　Soc。　And　which　is　the　greater　disgrace？…Answer。　　　Pol。　To　do。　　　Soc。　And　the　greater　disgrace　is　the　greater　evil？　　　Pol。　Certainly　not。　　　Soc。　I　understand　you　to　say；　if　I　am　not　mistaken；　that　the　honourable　is　not　the　same　as　the　good；　or　the　disgraceful　as　the　evil？　　　Pol。　Certainly　not。　　　Soc。　Let　me　ask　a　question　of　you：　When　you　speak　of　beautiful　things；　such　as　bodies；　colours；　figures；　sounds；　institutions；　do　you　not　call　them　beautiful　in　reference　to　some　standard：　bodies；　for　example；　are　beautiful　in　proportion　as　they　are　useful；　or　as　the　sight　of　them　gives　pleasure　to　the　spectators；　can　you　give　any　other　account　of　personal　beauty？　　　Pol。　I　cannot。　　　Soc。　And　you　would　say　of　figures　or　colours　generally　that　they　were　beautiful；　either　by　reason　of　the　pleasure　which　they　give；　or　of　their　use；　or　both？　　　Pol。　Yes；　I　should。　　　Soc。　And　you　would　call　sounds　and　music　beautiful　for　the　same　reason？　　　Pol。　I　should。　　　Soc。　Laws　and　institutions　also　have　no　beauty　in　them　except　in　so　far　as　they　are　useful　or　pleasant　or　both？　　　Pol。　I　think　not。　　　Soc。　And　may　not　the　same　be　said　of　the　beauty　of　knowledge？　　　Pol。　To　be　sure；　Socrates；　and　I　very　much　approve　of　your　measuring　beauty　by　the　standard　of　pleasure　and　utility。　　　Soc。　And　deformity　or　disgrace　may　be　equally　measured　by　the　opposite　standard　of　pain　and　evil？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Then　when　of　two　beautiful　things　one　exceeds　in　beauty；　the　measure　of　the　excess　is　to　be　taken　in　one　or　both　of　these；　that　is　to　say；　in　pleasure　or　utility　or　both？　　　Pol。　Very　true。　　　Soc。　And　of　two　deformed　thi