utilitarianism-第6章

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only　he　may　be　unable　to　conceive　the　possibility　of　happiness　to　himself；　consistently　with　conduct　opposed　to　the　general　good；　but　also　that　a　direct　impulse　to　promote　the　general　good　may　be　in　every　individual　one　of　the　habitual　motives　of　action；　and　the　sentiments　connected　therewith　may　fill　a　large　and　prominent　place　in　every　human　being's　sentient　existence。　If　the；　impugners　of　the　utilitarian　morality　represented　it　to　their　own　minds　in　this　its；　true　character；　I　know　not　what　recommendation　possessed　by　any　other　morality　they　could　possibly　affirm　to　be　wanting　to　it；　what　more　beautiful　or　more　exalted　developments　of　human　nature　any　other　ethical　system　can　be　supposed　to　foster；　or　what　springs　of　action；　not　accessible　to　the　utilitarian；　such　systems　rely　on　for　giving　effect　to　their　mandates。　　　The　objectors　to　utilitarianism　cannot　always　be　charged　with　representing　it　in　a　discreditable　light。　On　the　contrary；　those　among　them　who　entertain　anything　like　a　just　idea　of　its　disinterested　character；　sometimes　find　fault　with　its　standard　as　being　too　high　for　humanity。　They　say　it　is　exacting　too　much　to　require　that　people　shall　always　act　from　the　inducement　of　promoting　the　general　interests　of　society。　But　this　is　to　mistake　the　very　meaning　of　a　standard　of　morals；　and　confound　the　rule　of　action　with　the　motive　of　it。　It　is　the　business　of　ethics　to　tell　us　what　are　our　duties；　or　by　what　test　we　may　know　them；　but　no　system　of　ethics　requires　that　the　sole　motive　of　all　we　do　shall　be　a　feeling　of　duty；　on　the　contrary；　ninety…nine　hundredths　of　all　our　actions　are　done　from　other　motives；　and　rightly　so　done；　if　the　rule　of　duty　does　not　condemn　them。　It　is　the　more　unjust　to　utilitarianism　that　this　particular　misapprehension　should　be　made　a　ground　of　objection　to　it；　inasmuch　as　utilitarian　moralists　have　gone　beyond　almost　all　others　in　affirming　that　the　motive　has　nothing　to　do　with　the　morality　of　the　action；　though　much　with　the　worth　of　the　agent。　He　who　saves　a　fellow　creature　from　drowning　does　what　is　morally　right；　whether　his　motive　be　duty；　or　the　hope　of　being　paid　for　his　trouble；　he　who　betrays　the　friend　that　trusts　him；　is　guilty　of　a　crime；　even　if　his　object　be　to　serve　another　friend　to　whom　he　is　under　greater　obligations。　　　But　to　speak　only　of　actions　done　from　the　motive　of　duty；　and　in　direct　obedience　to　principle：　it　is　a　misapprehension　of　the　utilitarian　mode　of　thought；　to　conceive　it　as　implying　that　people　should　fix　their　minds　upon　so　wide　a　generality　as　the　world；　or　society　at　large。　The　great　majority　of　good　actions　are　intended　not　for　the　benefit　of　the　world；　but　for　that　of　individuals；　of　which　the　good　of　the　world　is　made　up；　and　the　thoughts　of　the　most　virtuous　man　need　not　on　these　occasions　travel　beyond　the　particular　persons　concerned；　except　so　far　as　is　necessary　to　assure　himself　that　in　benefiting　them　he　is　not　violating　the　rights；　that　is；　the　legitimate　and　authorised　expectations；　of　any　one　else。　The　multiplication　of　happiness　is；　according　to　the　utilitarian　ethics；　the　object　of　virtue：　the　occasions　on　which　any　person　（except　one　in　a　thousand）　has　it　in　his　power　to　do　this　on　an　extended　scale；　in　other　words　to　be　a　public　benefactor；　are　but　exceptional；　and　on　these　occasions　alone　is　he　called　on　to　consider　public　utility；　in　every　other　case；　private　utility；　the　interest　or　happiness　of　some　few　persons；　is　all　he　has　to　attend　to。　Those　alone　the　influence　of　whose　actions　extends　to　society　in　general；　need　concern　themselves　habitually　about　large　an　object。　In　the　case　of　abstinences　indeed…　of　things　which　people　forbear　to　do　from　moral　considerations；　though　the　consequences　in　the　particular　case　might　be　beneficial…　it　would　be　unworthy　of　an　intelligent　agent　not　to　be　consciously　aware　that　the　action　is　of　a　class　which；　if　practised　generally；　would　be　generally　injurious；　and　that　this　is　the　ground　of　the　obligation　to　abstain　from　it。　The　amount　of　regard　for　the　public　interest　implied　in　this　recognition；　is　no　greater　than　is　demanded　by　every　system　of　morals；　for　they　all　enjoin　to　abstain　from　whatever　is　manifestly　pernicious　to　society。　　　The　same　considerations　dispose　of　another　reproach　against　the　doctrine　of　utility；　founded　on　a　still　grosser　misconception　of　the　purpose　of　a　standard　of　morality；　and　of　the　very　meaning　of　the　words　right　and　wrong。　It　is　often　affirmed　that　utilitarianism　renders　men　cold　and　unsympathising；　that　it　chills　their　moral　feelings　towards　individuals；　that　it　makes　them　regard　only　the　dry　and　hard　consideration　of　the　consequences　of　actions；　not　taking　into　their　moral　estimate　the　qualities　from　which　those　actions　emanate。　If　the　assertion　means　that　they　do　not　allow　their　judgment　respecting　the　rightness　or　wrongness　of　an　action　to　be　influenced　by　their　opinion　of　the　qualities　of　the　person　who　does　it；　this　is　a　complaint　not　against　utilitarianism；　but　against　having　any　standard　of　morality　at　all；　for　certainly　no　known　ethical　standard　decides　an　action　to　be　good　or　bad　because　it　is　done　by　a　good　or　a　bad　man；　still　less　because　done　by　an　amiable；　a　brave；　or　a　benevolent　man；　or　the　contrary。　These　considerations　are　relevant；　not　to　the　estimation　of　actions；　but　of　persons；　and　there　is　nothing　in　the　utilitarian　theory　inconsistent　with　the　fact　that　there　are　other　things　which　interest　us　in　persons　besides　the　rightness　and　wrongness　of　their　actions。　The　Stoics；　indeed；　with　the　paradoxical　misuse　of　language　which　was　part　of　their　system；　and　by　which　they　strove　to　raise　themselves　above　all　concern　about　anything　but　virtue；　were　fond　of　saying　that　he　who　has　that　has　everything；　that　he；　and　only　he；　is　rich；　is　beautiful；　is　a　king。　But　no　claim　of　this　description　is　made　for　the　virtuous　man　by　the　utilitarian　doctrine。　Utilitarians　are　quite　aware　that　there　are　other　desirable　possessions　and　qualities　besides　virtue；　and　are　perfectly　willing　to　allow　to　all　of　them　their　full　worth。　They　are　also　aware　that　a　right　action　does　not　necessarily　indicate　a　virtuous　character；　and　that　actions　which　are　blamable；　often　proceed　from　qualities　entitled　to　praise。　When　this　is　apparent　in　any　particular　case；　it　modifies　their　estimation；　not　certainly　of　the　act；　but　of　the　agent。　I　grant　that　they　are；　notwithstanding；　of　opinion；　that　in　the　long　run　the　best　proof　of　a　good　character　is　good　actions；　and　resolutely　refuse　to　consider　any　mental　disposition　as　good；　of　which　the　predominant　tendency　is　to　produce　bad　conduct。　This　makes　them　unpopular　with　many　people；　but　it　is　an　unpopularity　which　they　must　share　with　every　one　who　regards　the　distinction　between　right　and　wrong　in　a　serious　light；　and　the　reproach　is　not　one　which　a　conscientious　utilitarian　need　be　anxious　to　repel。　　　If　no　more　be　meant　by　the　objection　than　that　many　utilitarians　look　on　the　morality　of　actions；　as　measured　by　the　utilitarian　standard；　with　too　exclusive　a　regard；　and　do　not　lay　sufficient　stress　upon　the　other　beauties　of　character　which　go　towards　making　a　human　being　lovable　or　admirable；　this　may　be　admitted。　Utilitarians　who　have　cultivated　their　moral　feelings；　but　not　their　sympathies　nor　their　artistic　perceptions；　do　fall　into　this　mistake；　and　so　do　all　other　moralists　under　the　same　conditions。　What　can　be　said　in　excuse　for　other　moralists　is　equally　available　for　them；　namely；　that；　if　there　is　to　be　any　error；　it　is　better　that　it　should　be　on　that　side。　As　a　matter　of　fact；　we　may　affirm　that　among　utilitarians　as　among　adherents　of　other　systems；　there　is　every　imaginable　degree　of　rigidity　and　of　laxity　in　the　application　of　their　standard：　some　are　even　puritanically　rigorous；　while　others　are　as　indulgent　as　can　possibly　be　desired　by　sinner　or　by　sentimentalist。　But　on　the　whole；　a　doctrine　which　brings　prominently　forward　the　interest　that　mankind　have　in　the　repression　and　prevention　of　conduct　which　violates　the　moral　law；　is　likely　to　be　inferior　to　no　other　in　turning　the　sanctions　of　opinion　again　such　violations。　It　is　true；　the　question；　What　does　violate　the　moral　law？　is　one　on　which　those　who　recognise　di