utilitarianism-第14章

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st　that　each　person　should　obtain　that　（whether　good　or　evil）　which　he　deserves；　and　unjust　that　he　should　obtain　a　good；　or　be　made　to　undergo　an　evil；　which　he　does　not　deserve。　This　is；　perhaps；　the　clearest　and　most　emphatic　form　in　which　the　idea　of　justice　is　conceived　by　the　general　mind。　As　it　involves　the　notion　of　desert；　the　question　arises；　what　constitutes　desert？　Speaking　in　a　general　way；　a　person　is　understood　to　deserve　good　if　he　does　right；　evil　if　he　does　wrong；　and　in　a　more　particular　sense；　to　deserve　good　from　those　to　whom　he　does　or　has　done　good；　and　evil　from　those　to　whom　he　does　or　has　done　evil。　The　precept　of　returning　good　for　evil　has　never　been　regarded　as　a　case　of　the　fulfilment　of　justice；　but　as　one　in　which　the　claims　of　justice　are　waived；　in　obedience　to　other　considerations。　　　Fourthly；　it　is　confessedly　unjust　to　break　faith　with　any　one：　to　violate　an　engagement；　either　express　or　implied；　or　disappoint　expectations　raised　by　our　conduct；　at　least　if　we　have　raised　those　expectations　knowingly　and　voluntarily。　Like　the　other　obligations　of　justice　already　spoken　of；　this　one　is　not　regarded　as　absolute；　but　as　capable　of　being　overruled　by　a　stronger　obligation　of　justice　on　the　other　side；　or　by　such　conduct　on　the　part　of　the　person　concerned　as　is　deemed　to　absolve　us　from　our　obligation　to　him；　and　to　constitute　a　forfeiture　of　the　benefit　which　he　has　been　led　to　expect。　　　Fifthly；　it　is；　by　universal　admission；　inconsistent　with　justice　to　be　partial；　to　show　favour　or　preference　to　one　person　over　another；　in　matters　to　which　favour　and　preference　do　not　properly　apply。　Impartiality；　however；　does　not　seem　to　be　regarded　as　a　duty　in　itself；　but　rather　as　instrumental　to　some　other　duty；　for　it　is　admitted　that　favour　and　preference　are　not　always　censurable；　and　indeed　the　cases　in　which　they　are　condemned　are　rather　the　exception　than　the　rule。　A　person　would　be　more　likely　to　be　blamed　than　applauded　for　giving　his　family　or　friends　no　superiority　in　good　offices　over　strangers；　when　he　could　do　so　without　violating　any　other　duty；　and　no　one　thinks　it　unjust　to　seek　one　person　in　preference　to　another　as　a　friend；　connection；　or　companion。　Impartiality　where　rights　are　concerned　is　of　course　obligatory；　but　this　is　involved　in　the　more　general　obligation　of　giving　to　every　one　his　right。　A　tribunal；　for　example；　must　be　impartial；　because　it　is　bound　to　award；　without　regard　to　any　other　consideration；　a　disputed　object　to　the　one　of　two　parties　who　has　the　right　to　it。　There　are　other　cases　in　which　impartiality　means；　being　solely　influenced　by　desert；　as　with　those　who；　in　the　capacity　of　judges；　preceptors；　or　parents；　administer　reward　and　punishment　as　such。　There　are　cases；　again；　in　which　it　means；　being　solely　influenced　by　consideration　for　the　public　interest；　as　in　making　a　selection　among　candidates　for　a　government　employment。　Impartiality；　in　short；　as　an　obligation　of　justice；　may　be　said　to　mean；　being　exclusively　influenced　by　the　considerations　which　it　is　supposed　ought　to　influence　the　particular　case　in　hand；　and　resisting　the　solicitation　of　any　motives　which　prompt　to　conduct　different　from　what　those　considerations　would　dictate。　　　Nearly　allied　to　the　idea　of　impartiality　is　that　of　equality；　which　often　enters　as　a　component　part　both　into　the　conception　of　justice　and　into　the　practice　of　it；　and；　in　the　eyes　of　many　persons；　constitutes　its　essence。　But　in　this；　still　more　than　in　any　other　case；　the　notion　of　justice　varies　in　different　persons；　and　always　conforms　in　its　variations　to　their　notion　of　utility。　Each　person　maintains　that　equality　is　the　dictate　of　justice；　except　where　he　thinks　that　expediency　requires　inequality。　The　justice　of　giving　equal　protection　to　the　rights　of　all；　is　maintained　by　those　who　support　the　most　outrageous　inequality　in　the　rights　themselves。　Even　in　slave　countries　it　is　theoretically　admitted　that　the　rights　of　the　slave；　such　as　they　are；　ought　to　be　as　sacred　as　those　of　the　master；　and　that　a　tribunal　which　fails　to　enforce　them　with　equal　strictness　is　wanting　in　justice；　while；　at　the　same　time；　institutions　which　leave　to　the　slave　scarcely　any　rights　to　enforce；　are　not　deemed　unjust；　because　they　are　not　deemed　inexpedient。　Those　who　think　that　utility　requires　distinctions　of　rank；　do　not　consider　it　unjust　that　riches　and　social　privileges　should　be　unequally　dispensed；　but　those　who　think　this　inequality　inexpedient；　think　it　unjust　also。　Whoever　thinks　that　government　is　necessary；　sees　no　injustice　in　as　much　inequality　as　is　constituted　by　giving　to　the　magistrate　powers　not　granted　to　other　people。　Even　among　those　who　hold　levelling　doctrines；　there　are　as　many　questions　of　justice　as　there　are　differences　of　opinion　about　expediency。　Some　Communists　consider　it　unjust　that　the　produce　of　the　labour　of　the　community　should　be　shared　on　any　other　principle　than　that　of　exact　equality；　others　think　it　just　that　those　should　receive　most　whose　wants　are　greatest；　while　others　hold　that　those　who　work　harder；　or　who　produce　more；　or　whose　services　are　more　valuable　to　the　community；　may　justly　claim　a　larger　quota　in　the　division　of　the　produce。　And　the　sense　of　natural　justice　may　be　plausibly　appealed　to　in　behalf　of　every　one　of　these　opinions。　　　Among　so　many　diverse　applications　of　the　term　justice；　which　yet　is　not　regarded　as　ambiguous；　it　is　a　matter　of　some　difficulty　to　seize　the　mental　link　which　holds　them　together；　and　on　which　the　moral　sentiment　adhering　to　the　term　essentially　depends。　Perhaps；　in　this　embarrassment；　some　help　may　be　derived　from　the　history　of　the　word；　as　indicated　by　its　etymology。　　　In　most；　if　not　in　all；　languages；　the　etymology　of　the　word　which　corresponds　to　Just；　points　distinctly　to　an　origin　connected　with　the　ordinances　of　law。　Justum　is　a　form　of　jussum；　that　which　has　been　ordered。　Dikaion　comes　directly　from　dike；　a　suit　at　law。　Recht；　from　which　came　right　and　righteous；　is　synonymous　with　law。　The　courts　of　justice；　the　administration　of　justice；　are　the　courts　and　the　administration　of　law。　La　justice；　in　French；　is　the　established　term　for　judicature。　I　am　not　committing　the　fallacy　imputed　with　some　show　of　truth　to　Horne　Tooke；　of　assuming　that　a　word　must　still　continue　to　mean　what　it　originally　meant。　Etymology　is　slight　evidence　of　what　the　idea　now　signified　is；　but　the　very　best　evidence　of　how　it　sprang　up。　There　can；　I　think；　be　no　doubt　that　the　idee　mere；　the　primitive　element；　in　the　formation　of　the　notion　of　justice；　was　conformity　to　law。　It　constituted　the　entire　idea　among　the　Hebrews；　up　to　the　birth　of　Christianity；　as　might　be　expected　in　the　case　of　a　people　whose　laws　attempted　to　embrace　all　subjects　on　which　precepts　were　required；　and　who　believed　those　laws　to　be　a　direct　emanation　from　the　Supreme　Being。　But　other　nations；　and　in　particular　the　Greeks　and　Romans；　who　knew　that　their　laws　had　been　made　originally；　and　still　continued　to　be　made；　by　men；　were　not　afraid　to　admit　that　those　men　might　make　bad　laws；　might　do；　by　law；　the　same　things；　and　from　the　same　motives；　which　if　done　by　individuals　without　the　sanction　of　law；　would　be　called　unjust。　And　hence　the　sentiment　of　injustice　came　to　be　attached；　not　to　all　violations　of　law；　but　only　to　violations　of　such　laws　as　ought　to　exist；　including　such　as　ought　to　exist；　but　do　not；　and　to　laws　themselves；　if　supposed　to　be　contrary　to　what　ought　to　be　law。　In　this　manner　the　idea　of　law　and　of　its　injunctions　was　still　predominant　in　the　notion　of　justice；　even　when　the　laws　actually　in　force　ceased　to　be　accepted　as　the　standard　of　it。　　　It　is　true　that　mankind　consider　the　idea　of　justice　and　its　obligations　as　applicable　to　many　things　which　neither　are；　nor　is　it　desired　that　they　should　be；　regulated　by　law。　Nobody　desires　that　laws　should　interfere　with　the　whole　detail　of　private　life；　yet　every　one　allows　that　in　all　daily　conduct　a　person　may　and　does　show　himself　to　be　either　just　or　unjust。　But　even　here；　the　idea　of　the　breach　of　what　ought　to　be　law；　still　lingers　in　a　modified　shape。　It　would　always　give　us　pleasure；　and　chime　in　with　our　feelings