utilitarianism-第12章

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r　thing；　very　ill　provided　with　sources　of　happiness；　if　there　were　not　this　provision　of　nature；　by　which　things　originally　indifferent；　but　conducive　to；　or　otherwise　associated　with；　the　satisfaction　of　our　primitive　desires；　become　in　themselves　sources　of　pleasure　more　valuable　than　the　primitive　pleasures；　both　in　permanency；　in　the　space　of　human　existence　that　they　are　capable　of　covering；　and　even　in　intensity。　　　Virtue；　according　to　the　utilitarian　conception；　is　a　good　of　this　description。　There　was　no　original　desire　of　it；　or　motive　to　it；　save　its　conduciveness　to　pleasure；　and　especially　to　protection　from　pain。　But　through　the　association　thus　formed；　it　may　be　felt　a　good　in　itself；　and　desired　as　such　with　as　great　intensity　as　any　other　good；　and　with　this　difference　between　it　and　the　love　of　money；　of　power；　or　of　fame；　that　all　of　these　may；　and　often　do；　render　the　individual　noxious　to　the　other　members　of　the　society　to　which　he　belongs；　whereas　there　is　nothing　which　makes　him　so　much　a　blessing　to　them　as　the　cultivation　of　the　disinterested　love　of　virtue。　And　consequently；　the　utilitarian　standard；　while　it　tolerates　and　approves　those　other　acquired　desires；　up　to　the　point　beyond　which　they　would　be　more　injurious　to　the　general　happiness　than　promotive　of　it；　enjoins　and　requires　the　cultivation　of　the　love　of　virtue　up　to　the　greatest　strength　possible；　as　being　above　all　things　important　to　the　general　happiness。　　　It　results　from　the　preceding　considerations；　that　there　is　in　reality　nothing　desired　except　happiness。　Whatever　is　desired　otherwise　than　as　a　means　to　some　end　beyond　itself；　and　ultimately　to　happiness；　is　desired　as　itself　a　part　of　happiness；　and　is　not　desired　for　itself　until　it　has　become　so。　Those　who　desire　virtue　for　its　own　sake；　desire　it　either　because　the　consciousness　of　it　is　a　pleasure；　or　because　the　consciousness　of　being　without　it　is　a　pain；　or　for　both　reasons　united；　as　in　truth　the　pleasure　and　pain　seldom　exist　separately；　but　almost　always　together；　the　same　person　feeling　pleasure　in　the　degree　of　virtue　attained；　and　pain　in　not　having　attained　more。　If　one　of　these　gave　him　no　pleasure；　and　the　other　no　pain；　he　would　not　love　or　desire　virtue；　or　would　desire　it　only　for　the　other　benefits　which　it　might　produce　to　himself　or　to　persons　whom　he　cared　for。　　　We　have　now；　then；　an　answer　to　the　question；　of　what　sort　of　proof　the　principle　of　utility　is　susceptible。　If　the　opinion　which　I　have　now　stated　is　psychologically　true…　if　human　nature　is　so　constituted　as　to　desire　nothing　which　is　not　either　a　part　of　happiness　or　a　means　of　happiness；　we　can　have　no　other　proof；　and　we　require　no　other；　that　these　are　the　only　things　desirable。　If　so；　happiness　is　the　sole　end　of　human　action；　and　the　promotion　of　it　the　test　by　which　to　judge　of　all　human　conduct；　from　whence　it　necessarily　follows　that　it　must　be　the　criterion　of　morality；　since　a　part　is　included　in　the　whole。　　　And　now　to　decide　whether　this　is　really　so；　whether　mankind　do　desire　nothing　for　itself　but　that　which　is　a　pleasure　to　them；　or　of　which　the　absence　is　a　pain；　we　have　evidently　arrived　at　a　question　of　fact　and　experience；　dependent；　like　all　similar　questions；　upon　evidence。　It　can　only　be　determined　by　practised　self…consciousness　and　self…observation；　assisted　by　observation　of　others。　I　believe　that　these　sources　of　evidence；　impartially　consulted；　will　declare　that　desiring　a　thing　and　finding　it　pleasant；　aversion　to　it　and　thinking　of　it　as　painful；　are　phenomena　entirely　inseparable；　or　rather　two　parts　of　the　same　phenomenon；　in　strictness　of　language；　two　different　modes　of　naming　the　same　psychological　fact：　that　to　think　of　an　object　as　desirable　（unless　for　the　sake　of　its　consequences）；　and　to　think　of　it　as　pleasant；　are　one　and　the　same　thing；　and　that　to　desire　anything；　except　in　proportion　as　the　idea　of　it　is　pleasant；　is　a　physical　and　metaphysical　impossibility。　　　So　obvious　does　this　appear　to　me；　that　I　expect　it　will　hardly　be　disputed：　and　the　objection　made　will　be；　not　that　desire　can　possibly　be　directed　to　anything　ultimately　except　pleasure　and　exemption　from　pain；　but　that　the　will　is　a　different　thing　from　desire；　that　a　person　of　confirmed　virtue；　or　any　other　person　whose　purposes　are　fixed；　carries　out　his　purposes　without　any　thought　of　the　pleasure　he　has　in　contemplating　them；　or　expects　to　derive　from　their　fulfilment；　and　persists　in　acting　on　them；　even　though　these　pleasures　are　much　diminished；　by　changes　in　his　character　or　decay　of　his　passive　sensibilities；　or　are　outweighed　by　the　pains　which　the　pursuit　of　the　purposes　may　bring　upon　him。　All　this　I　fully　admit；　and　have　stated　it　elsewhere；　as　positively　and　emphatically　as　any　one。　Will；　the　active　phenomenon；　is　a　different　thing　from　desire；　the　state　of　passive　sensibility；　and　though　originally　an　offshoot　from　it；　may　in　time　take　root　and　detach　itself　from　the　parent　stock；　so　much　so；　that　in　the　case　of　an　habitual　purpose；　instead　of　willing　the　thing　because　we　desire　it；　we　often　desire　it　only　because　we　will　it。　This；　however；　is　but　an　instance　of　that　familiar　fact；　the　power　of　habit；　and　is　nowise　confined　to　the　case　of　virtuous　actions。　Many　indifferent　things；　which　men　originally　did　from　a　motive　of　some　sort；　they　continue　to　do　from　habit。　Sometimes　this　is　done　unconsciously；　the　consciousness　coming　only　after　the　action：　at　other　times　with　conscious　volition；　but　volition　which　has　become　habitual；　and　is　put　in　operation　by　the　force　of　habit；　in　opposition　perhaps　to　the　deliberate　preference；　as　often　happens　with　those　who　have　contracted　habits　of　vicious　or　hurtful　indulgence。　　　Third　and　last　comes　the　case　in　which　the　habitual　act　of　will　in　the　individual　instance　is　not　in　contradiction　to　the　general　intention　prevailing　at　other　times；　but　in　fulfilment　of　it；　as　in　the　case　of　the　person　of　confirmed　virtue；　and　of　all　who　pursue　deliberately　and　consistently　any　determinate　end。　The　distinction　between　will　and　desire　thus　understood　is　an　authentic　and　highly　important　psychological　fact；　but　the　fact　consists　solely　in　this…　that　will；　like　all　other　parts　of　our　constitution；　is　amenable　to　habit；　and　that　we　may　will　from　habit　what　we　no　longer　desire　for　itself　or　desire　only　because　we　will　it。　It　is　not　the　less　true　that　will；　in　the　beginning；　is　entirely　produced　by　desire；　including　in　that　term　the　repelling　influence　of　pain　as　well　as　the　attractive　one　of　pleasure。　Let　us　take　into　consideration；　no　longer　the　person　who　has　a　confirmed　will　to　do　right；　but　him　in　whom　that　virtuous　will　is　still　feeble；　conquerable　by　temptation；　and　not　to　be　fully　relied　on；　by　what　means　can　it　be　strengthened？　How　can　the　will　to　be　virtuous；　where　it　does　not　exist　in　sufficient　force；　be　implanted　or　awakened？　Only　by　making　the　person　desire　virtue…　by　making　him　think　of　it　in　a　pleasurable　light；　or　of　its　absence　in　a　painful　one。　It　is　by　associating　the　doing　right　with　pleasure；　or　the　doing　wrong　with　pain；　or　by　eliciting　and　impressing　and　bringing　home　to　the　person's　experience　the　pleasure　naturally　involved　in　the　one　or　the　pain　in　the　other；　that　it　is　possible　to　call　forth　that　will　to　be　virtuous；　which；　when　confirmed；　acts　without　any　thought　of　either　pleasure　or　pain。　Will　is　the　child　of　desire；　and　passes　out　of　the　dominion　of　its　parent　only　to　come　under　that　of　habit。　That　which　is　the　result　of　habit　affords　no　presumption　of　being　intrinsically　good；　and　there　would　be　no　reason　for　wishing　that　the　purpose　of　virtue　should　become　independent　of　pleasure　and　pain；　were　it　not　that　the　influence　of　the　pleasurable　and　painful　associations　which　prompt　to　virtue　is　not　sufficiently　to　be　depended　on　for　unerring　constancy　of　action　until　it　has　acquired　the　support　of　habit。　Both　in　feeling　and　in　conduct；　habit　is　the　only　thing　which　imparts　certainty；　and　it　is　because　of　the　importance　to　others　of　being　able　to　rely　absolutely　on　one's　feelings　and　conduct；　and　to　oneself　of　being　able　to　rely　on　one's　own；　that　the　will　to　do　right　ought　to　be　cultivated　into　this　habitual　independence。　In　other　word