utilitarianism-第1章

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1863

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　UTILITARIANISM

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　by　John　Stuart　Mill

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　1
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　General　Remarks。


　　THERE　ARE　few　circumstances　among　those　which　make　up　the　present　condition　of　human　knowledge；　more　unlike　what　might　have　been　expected；　or　more　significant　of　the　backward　state　in　which　speculation　on　the　most　important　subjects　still　lingers；　than　the　little　progress　which　has　been　made　in　the　decision　of　the　controversy　respecting　the　criterion　of　right　and　wrong。　From　the　dawn　of　philosophy；　the　question　concerning　the　summum　bonum；　or；　what　is　the　same　thing；　concerning　the　foundation　of　morality；　has　been　accounted　the　main　problem　in　speculative　thought；　has　occupied　the　most　gifted　intellects；　and　divided　them　into　sects　and　schools；　carrying　on　a　vigorous　warfare　against　one　another。　And　after　more　than　two　thousand　years　the　same　discussions　continue；　philosophers　are　still　ranged　under　the　same　contending　banners；　and　neither　thinkers　nor　mankind　at　large　seem　nearer　to　being　unanimous　on　the　subject；　than　when　the　youth　Socrates　listened　to　the　old　Protagoras；　and　asserted　（if　Plato's　dialogue　be　grounded　on　a　real　conversation）　the　theory　of　utilitarianism　against　the　popular　morality　of　the　so…called　sophist。　　　It　is　true　that　similar　confusion　and　uncertainty；　and　in　some　cases　similar　discordance；　exist　respecting　the　first　principles　of　all　the　sciences；　not　excepting　that　which　is　deemed　the　most　certain　of　them；　mathematics；　without　much　impairing；　generally　indeed　without　impairing　at　all；　the　trustworthiness　of　the　conclusions　of　those　sciences。　An　apparent　anomaly；　the　explanation　of　which　is；　that　the　detailed　doctrines　of　a　science　are　not　usually　deduced　from；　nor　depend　for　their　evidence　upon；　what　are　called　its　first　principles。　Were　it　not　so；　there　would　be　no　science　more　precarious；　or　whose　conclusions　were　more　insufficiently　made　out；　than　algebra；　which　derives　none　of　its　certainty　from　what　are　commonly　taught　to　learners　as　its　elements；　since　these；　as　laid　down　by　some　of　its　most　eminent　teachers；　are　as　full　of　fictions　as　English　law；　and　of　mysteries　as　theology。　The　truths　which　are　ultimately　accepted　as　the　first　principles　of　a　science；　are　really　the　last　results　of　metaphysical　analysis；　practised　on　the　elementary　notions　with　which　the　science　is　conversant；　and　their　relation　to　the　science　is　not　that　of　foundations　to　an　edifice；　but　of　roots　to　a　tree；　which　may　perform　their　office　equally　well　though　they　be　never　dug　down　to　and　exposed　to　light。　But　though　in　science　the　particular　truths　precede　the　general　theory；　the　contrary　might　be　expected　to　be　the　case　with　a　practical　art；　such　as　morals　or　legislation。　All　action　is　for　the　sake　of　some　end；　and　rules　of　action；　it　seems　natural　to　suppose；　must　take　their　whole　character　and　colour　from　the　end　to　which　they　are　subservient。　When　we　engage　in　a　pursuit；　a　clear　and　precise　conception　of　what　we　are　pursuing　would　seem　to　be　the　first　thing　we　need；　instead　of　the　last　we　are　to　look　forward　to。　A　test　of　right　and　wrong　must　be　the　means；　one　would　think；　of　ascertaining　what　is　right　or　wrong；　and　not　a　consequence　of　having　already　ascertained　it。　　　The　difficulty　is　not　avoided　by　having　recourse　to　the　popular　theory　of　a　natural　faculty；　a　sense　or　instinct；　informing　us　of　right　and　wrong。　For…　besides　that　the　existence　of　such…　a　moral　instinct　is　itself　one　of　the　matters　in　dispute…　those　believers　in　it　who　have　any　pretensions　to　philosophy；　have　been　obliged　to　abandon　the　idea　that　it　discerns　what　is　right　or　wrong　in　the　particular　case　in　hand；　as　our　other　senses　discern　the　sight　or　sound　actually　present。　Our　moral　faculty；　according　to　all　those　of　its　interpreters　who　are　entitled　to　the　name　of　thinkers；　supplies　us　only　with　the　general　principles　of　moral　judgments；　it　is　a　branch　of　our　reason；　not　of　our　sensitive　faculty；　and　must　be　looked　to　for　the　abstract　doctrines　of　morality；　not　for　perception　of　it　in　the　concrete。　The　intuitive；　no　less　than　what　may　be　termed　the　inductive；　school　of　ethics；　insists　on　the　necessity　of　general　laws。　They　both　agree　that　the　morality　of　an　individual　action　is　not　a　question　of　direct　perception；　but　of　the　application　of　a　law　to　an　individual　case。　They　recognise　also；　to　a　great　extent；　the　same　moral　laws；　but　differ　as　to　their　evidence；　and　the　source　from　which　they　derive　their　authority。　According　to　the　one　opinion；　the　principles　of　morals　are　evident　a　priori；　requiring　nothing　to　command　assent；　except　that　the　meaning　of　the　terms　be　understood。　According　to　the　other　doctrine；　right　and　wrong；　as　well　as　truth　and　falsehood；　are　questions　of　observation　and　experience。　But　both　hold　equally　that　morality　must　be　deduced　from　principles；　and　the　intuitive　school　affirm　as　strongly　as　the　inductive；　that　there　is　a　science　of　morals。　Yet　they　seldom　attempt　to　make　out　a　list　of　the　a　priori　principles　which　are　to　serve　as　the　premises　of　the　science；　still　more　rarely　do　they　make　any　effort　to　reduce　those　various　principles　to　one　first　principle；　or　common　ground　of　obligation。　They　either　assume　the　ordinary　precepts　of　morals　as　of　a　priori　authority；　or　they　lay　down　as　the　common　groundwork　of　those　maxims；　some　generality　much　less　obviously　authoritative　than　the　maxims　themselves；　and　which　has　never　succeeded　in　gaining　popular　acceptance。　Yet　to　support　their　pretensions　there　ought　either　to　be　some　one　fundamental　principle　or　law；　at　the　root　of　all　morality；　or　if　there　be　several；　there　should　be　a　determinate　order　of　precedence　among　them；　and　the　one　principle；　or　the　rule　for　deciding　between　the　various　principles　when　they　conflict；　ought　to　be　self…evident。　　　To　inquire　how　far　the　bad　effects　of　this　deficiency　have　been　mitigated　in　practice；　or　to　what　extent　the　moral　beliefs　of　mankind　have　been　vitiated　or　made　uncertain　by　the　absence　of　any　distinct　recognition　of　an　ultimate　standard；　would　imply　a　complete　survey　and　criticism；　of　past　and　present　ethical　doctrine。　It　would；　however；　be　easy　to　show　that　whatever　steadiness　or　consistency　these　moral　beliefs　have；　attained；　has　been　mainly　due　to　the　tacit　influence　of　a　standard　not　recognised。　Although　the　non…existence　of　an　acknowledged　first　principle　has　made　ethics　not　so　much　a　guide　as　a　consecration　of　men's　actual　sentiments；　still；　as　men's　sentiments；　both　of　favour　and　of　aversion；　are　greatly　influenced　by　what　they　suppose　to　be　the　effects　of　things　upon　their　happiness；　the　principle　of　utility；　or　as　Bentham　latterly　called　it；　the　greatest　happiness　principle；　has　had　a　large　share　in　forming　the　moral　doctrines　even　of　those　who　most　scornfully　reject　its　authority。　Nor　is　there　any　school　of　thought　which　refuses　to　admit　that　the　influence　of　actions　on　happiness　is　a　most　material　and　even　predominant　consideration　in　many　of　the　details　of　morals；　however　unwilling　to　acknowledge　it　as　the　fundamental　principle　of　morality；　and　the　source　of　moral　obligation。　I　might　go　much　further；　and　say　that　to　all　those　a　priori　moralists　who　deem　it　necessary　to　argue　at　all；　utilitarian　arguments　are　indispensable。　It　is　not　my　present　purpose　to　criticise　these　thinkers；　but　I　cannot　help　referring；　for　illustration；　to　a　systematic　treatise　by　one　of　the　most　illustrious　of　them；　the　Metaphysics　of　Ethics；　by　Kant。　This　remarkable　man；　whose　system　of　thought　will　long　remain　one　of　the　landmarks　in　the　history　of　philosophical　speculation；　does；　in　the　treatise　in　question；　lay　down　a　universal　first　principle　as　the　origin　and　ground　of　moral　obligation；　it　is　this：　〃So　act；　that　the　rule　on　which　thou　actest　would　admit　of　being　adopted　as　a　law　by　all　rational　beings。〃　But　when　he　begins　to　deduce　from　this　precept　any　of　the　actual　duties　of　morality；　he　fails；　almost　grotesquely；　to　show　that　there　would　be　any　contradiction；　any　logical　（not　to　say　physical）　impossibility；　in　the　adoption　by　all　rational　beings　of　the　most　outrageously　immoral　rules　of　conduct。　All　he　shows　is　that　t