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be trusted； comes so close to the opprobrium of directly calling him a
liar； that the boundary…line separating what； in such a case；
belongs to jurisprudence； and what is special to ethics； can hardly be
otherwise drawn。
The reason why such a division into separate rights has been
introduced into the system of natural right； viewed as including all
that is innate； was not without a purpose。 Its object was to enable
proof to be more readily put forward in case of any controversy
arising about an acquired right； and questions emerging either with
reference to a fact that might be in doubt； or； if that were
established； in reference to a right under dispute。 For the party
repudiating an obligation； and on whom the burden of proof （onus
probandi） might be incumbent； could thus methodically refer to his
innate right of freedom as specified under various relations in
detail； and could therefore found upon them equally as different
titles of right。
In the relation of innate right； and consequently of the internal
mine and thine； there is therefore not rights； but only one right。
And； accordingly； this highest division of rights into innate and
acquired； which evidently consists of two members extremely unequal in
their contents is properly placed in the introduction； and the
subdivisions of the science of right may be referred in detail to
the external mine and thine。
C。 Methodical Division of the Science of Right。
The highest division of the system of natural right should not be…
as it is frequently put… into 〃natural right〃 and 〃social right；〃
but into natural right and civil right。 The first constitutes
private right； the second； public right。 For it is not the 〃social
state〃 but the 〃civil state〃 that is opposed to the 〃state of nature〃；
for in the 〃state of nature〃 there may well be society of some kind；
but there is no 〃civil〃 society； as an institution securing the mine
and thine by public laws。 It is thus that right； viewed under
reference to the state of nature； is specially called private right。
The whole of the principles of right will therefore fall to be
expounded under the two subdivisions of private right and public
right。
CH1
FIRST PART。 PRIVATE RIGHT。
The System of those Laws Which Require No External Promulgation。
CHAPTER I。 Of the Mode of Having Anything External as One's Own。
1。 The Meaning of 〃Mine〃 in Right
（Meum Juris）。
Anything is 〃Mine〃 by right； or is rightfully mine； when I am so
connected with it； that if any other person should make use of it
without my consent； he would do me a lesion or injury。 The
subjective condition of the use of anything is possession of it。
An external thing； however as such could only be mine； if I may
assume it to be possible that I can be wronged by the use which
another might make of it when it is not actually in my possession。
Hence it would be a contradiction to have anything external as one's
own； were not the conception of possession capable of two different
meanings； as sensible possession that is perceivable by the senses；
and rational possession that is perceivable only by the intellect。
By the former is to be understood a physical possession； and by the
latter； a purely juridical possession of the same object。
The description of an object as 〃external to me〃 may signify
either that it is merely 〃different and distinct from me as a
subject；〃 or that it is also 〃a thing placed outside of me； and to
be found elsewhere in space or time。〃 Taken in the first sense； the
term possession signifies rational possession； and； in the second
sense； it must mean empirical possession。 A rational or intelligible
possession； if such be possible； is possession viewed apart from
physical holding or detention （detentio）。
2。 Juridical Postulate of the Practical Reason。
It is possible to have any external object of my will as mine。 In
other words； a maxim to this effect… were it to become law… that any
object on which the will can be exerted must remain objectively in
itself without an owner； as res nullius； is contrary to the
principle of right。
For an object of any act of my will； is something that it would be
physically within my power to use。 Now； suppose there were things that
by right should absolutely not be in our power； or； in other words；
that it would be wrong or inconsistent with the freedom of all；
according to universal law； to make use of them。 On this
supposition； freedom would so far be depriving itself of the use of
its voluntary activity； in thus putting useable objects out of all
possibility of use。 In practical relations； this would be to
annihilate them； by making them res nullius； notwithstanding the
fact act acts of will in relation to such things would formally
harmonize； in the actual use of them； with the external freedom of all
according to universal laws。 Now the pure practical reason lays down
only formal laws as principles to regulate the exercise of the will；
and therefore abstracts from the matter of the act of will； as regards
the other qualities of the object； which is considered only in so
far as it is an object of the activity of the will。 Hence the
practical reason cannot contain； in reference to such an object； an
absolute prohibition of its use； because this would involve a
contradiction of external freedom with itself。 An object of my free
will； however； is one which I have the physical capability of making
some use of at will； since its use stands in my power （in potentia）。
This is to be distinguished from having the object brought under my
disposal （in postestatem meam reductum）； which supposes not a
capability merely； but also a particular act of the free…will。 But
in order to consider something merely as an object of my will as such；
it is sufficient to be conscious that I have it in my power。 It is
therefore an assumption a priori of the practical reason to regard and
treat every object within the range of my free exercise of will as
objectively a possible mine or thine。
This postulate may be called 〃a permissive law〃 of the practical
reason； as giving us a special title which we could not evolve out
of the mere conceptions of right generally。 And this title constitutes
the right to impose upon all others an obligation； not otherwise
laid upon them； to abstain from the use of certain objects of our free
choice； because we have already taken them into our possession。 Reason
wills that this shall be recognised as a valid principle； and it
does so as practical reason； and it is enabled by means of this
postulate a priori to enlarge its range of activity in practice。
3。 Possession and Ownership。
Any one who would assert the right to a thing as his must be in
possession of it as an object。 Were he not its actual possessor or
owner； he could not be wronged or injured by the use which another
might make of it without his consent。 For； should anything external to
him； and in no way connected with him by right； affect this object； it
could not affect himself as a subject； nor do him any wrong； unless he
stood in a relation of ownership to it。
4。 Exposition of the Conception of the。
External Mine and Thine。
There can only be three external objects of my will in the
activity of choice：
（1） A corporeal thing external to me；
（2） The free…will of another in the performance of a particular
act （praestatio）；
（3） The state of another in relation to myself。
These correspond to the categories of substance； causality； and
reciprocity； and they form the practical relations between me and
external objects； according to the laws of freedom。
A。 I can only call a corporeal thing or an object in space 〃mine；〃
when； even although not in physical possession of it； I am able to
assert that I am in possessio