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punishment。
As regards civil offices； the question arises as to whether the
sovereign has the right； after bestowing an office on an individual；
to take it again away at his mere pleasure； without any crime having
been committed by the holder of the office。 I say； 〃No。〃 For what
the united will of the people would never resolve； regarding their
civil officers； cannot （constitutionally） be determined by the
sovereign regarding them。 The people have to bear the cost incurred by
the appointment of an official； and undoubtedly it must be their
will that any one in office should be completely competent for its
duties。 But such competency can only be acquired by a long preparation
and training； and this process would necessarily occupy the time
that would be required for acquiring the means of support by a
different occupation。 Arbitrary and frequent changes would
therefore； as a rule； have the effect of filling offices with
functionaries who have not acquired the skill required for their
duties； and whose judgements had not attained maturity by practice。
All this is contrary to the purpose of the state。 And besides it is
requisite in the interest of the people that it should be possible for
every individual to rise from a lower office to the higher offices； as
these latter would otherwise fall into incompetent hands； and that
competent officials generally should have some guarantee of
life…long provision。
Civil dignities include not only such as are connected with a public
office； but also those which make the possessors of them； without
any accompanying services to the state； members of a higher class or
rank。 The latter constitute the nobility； whose members are
distinguished from the common citizens who form the mass of the
people。 The rank of the nobility is inherited by male descendants； and
these again communicate it to wives who are not nobly born。 Female
descendants of noble families； however； do not communicate their
rank to husbands who are not of noble birth； but they descend
themselves into the common civil status of the people。 This being
so； the question then emerges as to whether the sovereign has the
right to found a hereditary rank and class； intermediate between
himself and the other citizens？ The import of this question does not
turn on whether it is conformable to the prudence of the sovereign；
from regard to his own and the people's interests； to have such an
institution； but whether it is in accordance with the right of the
people that they should have a class of persons above them； who； while
being subjects like themselves； are yet born as their commanders； or
at least as privileged superiors？ The answer to this question； as in
previous instances； is to be derived from the principle that 〃what the
people； as constituting the whole mass of the subjects； could not
determine regarding themselves and their associated citizens； cannot
be constitutionally determined by the sovereign regarding the people。〃
Now a hereditary nobility is a rank which takes precedence of merit
and is hoped for without any good reason… a thing of the imagination
without genuine reality。 For if an ancestor had merit； he could not
transmit it to his posterity； but they must always acquire it for
themselves。 Nature has in fact not so arranged that the talent and
will which give rise to merit in the state； are hereditary。 And
because it cannot be supposed of any individual that he will throw
away his freedom； it is impossible that the common will of all the
people should agree to such a groundless prerogative； and hence the
sovereign cannot make it valid。 It may happen； however； that such an
anomaly as that of subjects who would be more than citizens； in the
manner of born officials； or hereditary professors； has slipped into
the mechanism of government in olden times； as in the case of the
feudal system； which was almost entirely organized with reference to
war。 Under such circumstances； the state cannot deal otherwise with
this error of a wrongly instituted rank in its midst； than by the
remedy of a gradual extinction through hereditary positions being left
unfilled as they fall vacant。 The state has therefore the right
provisorily to let a dignity in title continue； until the public
opinion matures on the subject。 And this will thus pass from the
threefold division into sovereign； nobles； and people； to the
twofold and only natural division into sovereign and people。
No individual in the state can indeed be entirely without dignity；
for he has at least that of being a citizen； except when he has lost
his civil status by a crime。 As a criminal he is still maintained in
life； but he is made the mere instrument of the will of another；
whether it be the state or a particular citizen。 In the latter
position； in which he could only be placed by a juridical judgement；
he would practically become a slave； and would belong as property
（dominium） to another； who would be not merely his master （herus）
but his owner （dominus）。 Such an owner would be entitled to exchange
or alienate him as a thing； to use him at will except for shameful
purposes； and to dispose of his powers； but not of his life and
members。 No one can bind himself to such a condition of dependence； as
he would thereby cease to be a person； and it is only as a person that
he can make a contract。 It may； however； appear that one man may
bind himself to another by a contract of hire； to discharge a
certain service that is permissible in its kind； but is left
entirely undetermined as regards its measure or amount； and that as
receiving wages or board or protection in return； he thus becomes only
a servant subject to the will of a master （subditus） and not a slave
（servus）。 But this is an illusion。 For if masters are entitled to
use the powers of such subjects at will； they may exhaust these
powers… as has been done in the case of Negroes in the Sugar Island…
and they may thus reduce their servants to despair and death。 But this
would imply that they had actually given themselves away to their
masters as property； which； in the case of persons； is impossible。 A
person can； therefore； only contract to perform work that is defined
both in quality and quantity； either as a day…labourer or as a
domiciled subject。 In the latter case he may enter into a contract
of lease for the use of the land of a superior； giving a definite rent
or annual return for its utilization by himself； or he may contract
for his service as a labourer upon the land。 But he does not thereby
make himself a slave； or a bondsman； or a serf attached to the soil
（glebae adscriptus）； as he would thus divest himself of his
personality； he can only enter into a temporary or at most a heritable
lease。 And even if by committing a crime he has personally become
subjected to another； this subject…condition does not become
hereditary； for he has only brought it upon himself by his own
wrongdoing。 Neither can one who has been begotten by a slave be
claimed as property on the ground of the cost of his rearing；
because such rearing is an absolute duty naturally incumbent upon
parents； and in case the parents be slaves； it devolves upon their
masters or owners； who； in undertaking the possession of such
subjects； have also made themselves responsible for the performance of
their duties。
E。 The Right of Punishing and of Pardoning。
I。 The Right of Punishing。
The right of administering punishment is the right of the
sovereign as the supreme power to inflict pain upon a subject on
account of a crime committed by him。 The head of the state cannot
therefore be punished； but his supremacy may be withdrawn from him。
Any transgression of the public law which makes him who commits it
incapable of being a citizen； constitutes a crime； either simply as
a private crime （crimen）； or also as a public crime （crimen publicum）。
Private crimes are dealt with