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both； and consequently so far only as the will of both is declared
at the same time or simultaneously。 Now； such simultaneousness is
impossible by empirical acts of declaration； which can only follow
each other in time and are never actually simultaneous。 For if I
have promised； and another person is now merely willing to accept；
during the interval before actual acceptance； however short it may be；
I may retract my offer； because I am thus far still free； and； on
the other side； the acceptor； for the same reason； may likewise hold
himself not to be bound； up till the moment of acceptance； by his
counter…declaration following upon the promise。 The external
formalities or solemnities （solemnia） on the conclusion of a contract…
such as shaking hands or breaking a straw （stipula） laid hold of by
two persons… and all the various modes of confirming the
declarations on either side； prove in fact the embarrassment of the
contracting parties as to how and in what way they may represent
declarations； which are always successive； as existing
simultaneously at the same moment； and these forms fail to do this。
They are； by their very nature； acts necessarily following each
other in time； so that when the one act is； the other either is not
yet or is no longer。
It is only the philosophical transcendental deduction of the
conception of acquisition by contract that can remove all these
difficulties。 In a juridical external relation； my taking possession
of the free…will of another； as the cause that determined it to a
certain act； is conceived at first empirically by means of the
declaration and counter…declaration of the free…will of each of us
in time； as the sensible conditions of taking possession； and the
two juridical acts must necessarily be regarded as following one
another in time。 But because this relation； viewed as juridical； is
purely rational in itself； the will as a law…giving faculty of
reason represents this possession as intelligible or rational
（possessio noumenon）； in accordance with conceptions of freedom and
under abstraction of those empirical conditions。 And now； the two acts
of promise and acceptance are not regarded as following one another in
time； but； in the manner of a pactum re initum； as proceeding from a
common will； which is expressed by the term 〃at the same time；〃 or
〃simultaneous；〃 and the object promised （promissum） is represented；
under elimination of empirical conditions； as acquired according to
the law of the pure practical reason。
That this is the true and only possible deduction of the idea of
acquisition by contract is sufficiently attested by the laborious
yet always futile striving of writers on jurisprudence such as Moses
Mendelssohn in his Jerusalem… to adduce a proof of its rational
possibility。 The question is put thus： 〃Why ought I to keep my
Promise？〃 For it is assumed as understood by all that I ought to do
so。 It is； however； absolutely impossible to give any further proof of
the categorical imperative implied； just as it is impossible for the
geometrician to prove by rational syllogisms that in order to
construct a triangle I must take three lines… so far an analytical
proposition… of which three lines any two together must be greater
than the third… a synthetical proposition； and like the former a
priori。 It is a postulate of the pure reason that we ought to abstract
from all the sensible conditions of space and time in reference to the
conception of right； and the theory of the possibility of such
abstraction from these conditions； without taking away the reality
of the possession； just constitutes the transcendental deduction of
the conception of acquisition by contract。 It is quite akin to what
was presented under the last title； as the theory of acquisition by
occupation of the external object。
20。 What is Acquired by Contract。
But what is that； designated as external； which I acquire by
contract？ As it is only the causality of the active will of another；
in respect of the performance of something promised to me； I do not
immediately acquire thereby an external thing； but an act of the
will in question； whereby a thing is brought under my power so that
I make it mine。 By the contract； therefore； I acquire the promise of
another； as distinguished from the thing promised； and yet something
is thereby added to my having and possession。 I have become the richer
in possession （locupletior） by the acquisition of an active obligation
that I can bring to bear upon the freedom and capability of another。
This my right； however； is only a personal right； valid only to the
effect of acting upon a particular physical person and specially
upon the causality of his will； so that he shall perform something for
me。 It is not a real right upon that moral person； which is identified
with the idea of the united will of all viewed a priori； and through
which alone I can acquire a right valid against every possessor of the
thing。 For； it is in this that all right in a thing consists。
The transfer or transmission of what is mine to another by contract；
takes place according to the law of continuity （lex continui）。
Possession of the object is not interrupted for a moment during this
act； for； otherwise； I would acquire an object in this state as a
thing that had no possessor； and it would thus be acquired originally；
which is contrary to the idea of a contract。 This continuity； however；
implies that it is not the particular will of either the promiser or
the acceptor； but their united will in common； that transfers what
is mine to another。 And hence it is not accomplished in such a
manner that the promiser first relinquishes （derelinquit） his
possession for the benefit of another； or renounces his right
（renunciat）； and thereupon the other at the same time enters upon
it； or conversely。 The transfer （translatio） is therefore an act in
which the object belongs for a moment at the same time to both； just
as in the parabolic path of a projectile the object on reaching its
highest point may be regarded for a moment as at the same time both
rising and falling； and as thus passing in fact from the ascending
to the falling motion。
21。 Acceptance and Delivery。
A thing is not acquired in a case of contract by the acceptance
（acceptatio） of the promise； but only by the delivery （traditio） of
the object promised。 For all promise is relative to performance； and
if what was promised is a thing； the performance cannot be executed
otherwise than by an act whereby the acceptor is put by the promiser
into possession of the thing； and this is delivery。 Before the
delivery and the reception of the thing； the performance of the act
required has not yet taken place； the thing has not yet passed from
the one person to the other and； consequently； has not been acquired
by that other。 Hence the right arising from a contract is only a
personal right； and it only becomes a real right by delivery。
A contract upon which delivery immediately follows （pactum re
initum） excludes any interval of time between its conclusion and its
execution； and as such it requires no further particular act in the
future by which one person may transfer to another what is his。 But if
there is a time… definite or indefinite… agreed upon between them
for the delivery； the question then arises whether the thing has
already before that time become the acceptor's by the contract； so
that his right is a right in the thing； or whether a further special
contract regarding the delivery alone must be entered upon； so that
the right that is acquired by mere acceptance is only a personal
right； and thus it does not become a right in the thing until
delivery？ That the relation must be determined according to the latter
alternative will be clear from what follows。
Suppose I conclude a contract about a thing that I wish to
acquire… such as a horse