按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
kers； for they necessarily have the instinct of self…preservation； and foresee their dangers。 It is even more to their interest than to the interest of the masses themselves that the latter should be quiet and contented。 The happiness of the people should be ready made for the people。 If you look at society as a whole from this point of view； you will soon see； as I do； that the privilege of election ought only to be exercised by men who possess wealth； power； or intelligence； and you will likewise see that the action of the deputies they may choose to represent them should be considerably restricted。
〃The maker of laws； gentlemen； should be in advance of his age。 It is his business to ascertain the tendency of erroneous notions popularly held； to see the exact direction in which the ideas of a nation are tending； he labors for the future rather than for the present； and for the rising generation rather than for the one that is passing away。 But if you call in the masses to make the laws； can they rise above their own level？ Nay。 The more faithfully an assembly represents the opinions held by the crowd； the less it will know about government； the less lofty its ideas will be； and the more vague and vacillating its policy； for the crowd is and always will be simply a crowd； and this especially with us in France。 Law involves submission to regulations； man is naturally opposed to rules and regulations of all kinds； especially if they interfere with his interests； so is it likely that the masses will enact laws that are contrary to their own inclinations？ No。
〃Very often legislation ought to run counter to the prevailing tendencies of the time。 If the law is to be shaped by the prevailing habits of thought and tendencies of a nation； would not that mean that in Spain a direct encouragement would be given to idleness and religious intolerance； in England； to the commercial spirit； in Italy； to the love of the arts that may be the expression of a society； but by which no society can entirely exist； in Germany； feudal class distinctions would be fostered； and here； in France； popular legislation would promote the spirit of frivolity； the sudden craze for an idea； and the readiness to split into factions which has always been our bane。
〃What has happened in the forty years since the electors took it upon themselves to make laws for France？ We have something like forty thousand laws！ A people with forty thousand laws might as well have none at all。 Is it likely that five hundred mediocrities （for there are never more than a hundred great minds to do the work of any one century）； is it likely that five hundred mediocrities will have the wit to rise to the level of these considerations？ Not they！ Here is a constant stream of men poured forth from five hundred different places； they will interpret the spirit of the law in divers manners； and there should be a unity of conception in the law。
〃But I will go yet further。 Sooner or later an assembly of this kind comes to be swayed by one man； and instead of a dynasty of kings； you have a constantly changing and costly succession of prime ministers。 There comes a Mirabeau or a Danton； a Robespierre or a Napoleon； or proconsuls； or an emperor； and there is an end of deliberations and debates。 In fact； it takes a determinate amount of force to raise a given weight； the force may be distributed； and you may have a less or greater number of levers； but it comes to the same thing in the end： the force must be in proportion to the weight。 The weight in this case is the ignorant and suffering mass of people who form the lowest stratum of society。 The attitude of authority is bound to be repressive； and great concentration of the governing power is needed to neutralize the force of a popular movement。 This is the application of the principle that I unfolded when I spoke just now of the way in which the class privileged to govern should be restricted。 If this class is composed of men of ability； they will obey this natural law； and compel the country to obey。 If you collect a crowd of mediocrities together； sooner or later they will fall under the dominion of a stronger head。 A deputy of talent understands the reasons for which a government exists； the mediocre deputy simply comes to terms with force。 An assembly either obeys an idea； like the Convention in the time of the Terror； a powerful personality； like the Corps Legislatif under the rule of Napoleon； or falls under the domination of a system or of wealth； as it has done in our own day。 The Republican Assembly； that dream of some innocent souls； is an impossibility。 Those who would fain bring it to pass are either grossly deluded dupes or would… be tyrants。 Do you not think that there is something ludicrous about an Assembly which gravely sits in debate upon the perils of a nation which ought to be roused into immediate action？ It is only right of course that the people should elect a body of representatives who will decide questions of supplies and of taxation； this institution has always existed； under the sway of the most tyrannous ruler no less than under the sceptre of the mildest of princes。 Money is not to be taken by force； there are natural limits to taxation； and if they are overstepped； a nation either rises up in revolt； or lays itself down to die。 Again； if this elective body； changing from time to time according to the needs and ideas of those whom it represents； should refuse obedience to a bad law in the name of the people； well and good。 But to imagine that five hundred men； drawn from every corner of the kingdom； will make a good law！ Is it not a dreary joke； for which the people will sooner or later have to pay？ They have a change of masters； that is all。
〃Authority ought to be given to one man； he alone should have the task of making the laws； and he should be a man who； by force of circumstances； is continually obliged to submit his actions to general approbation。 But the only restraints that can be brought to bear upon the exercise of power； be it the power of the one； of the many； or of the multitude； are to be found in the religious institutions of a country。 Religion forms the only adequate safeguard against the abuse of supreme power。 When a nation ceases to believe in religion； it becomes ungovernable in consequence； and its prince perforce becomes a tyrant。 The Chambers that occupy an intermediate place between rulers and their subjects are powerless to prevent these results； and can only mitigate them to a very slight extent； Assemblies； as I have said before； are bound to become the accomplices of tyranny on the one hand； or of insurrection on the other。 My own leanings are towards a government by one man； but though it is good； it cannot be absolutely good； for the results of every policy will always depend upon the condition and the belief of the nation。 If a nation is in its dotage； if it has been corrupted to the core by philosophism and the spirit of discussion； it is on the high…road to despotism； from which no form of free government will save it。 And； at the same time； a righteous people will nearly always find liberty even under a despotic rule。 All this goes to show the necessity for restricting the right of election within very narrow limits； the necessity for a strong government； the necessity for a powerful religion which makes the rich man the friend of the poor； and enjoins upon the poor an absolute submission to their lot。 It is； in fact； really imperative that the Assemblies should be deprived of all direct legislative power； and should confine themselves to the registration of laws and to questions of taxation。
〃I know that different ideas from these exist in many minds。 To…day； as in past ages； there ware enthusiasts who seek for perfection； and who would like to have society better ordered than it is at present。 But innovations which tend to bring about a kind of social topsy… turvydom； ought only to be undertaken by general consent。 Let the innovators have patience。 When I remember how long it has taken Christianity to establish itself； how many centuries it has taken to bring about a purely moral revolution which surely ought to have been accomplished peacefully； the thought of the ho