友情提示:如果本网页打开太慢或显示不完整,请尝试鼠标右键“刷新”本网页!阅读过程发现任何错误请告诉我们,谢谢!! 报告错误
哔哔读书 返回本书目录 我的书架 我的书签 TXT全本下载 进入书吧 加入书签

prior analytics-第9章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!






always necessary。 Let A be 'moving'; B 'science'; C 'man'。 A then will



belong to no B; but B is possible for all C。 And the conclusion will



not be necessary。 For it is not necessary that no man should move;



rather it is not necessary that any man should move。 Clearly then



the conclusion establishes that one term does not necessarily belong



to any instance of another term。 But we must take our terms better。



  If the minor premiss is negative and indicates possibility; from the



actual premisses taken there can be no syllogism; but if the



problematic premiss is converted; a syllogism will be possible; as



before。 Let A belong to all B; and let B possibly belong to no C。 If



the terms are arranged thus; nothing necessarily follows: but if the



proposition BC is converted and it is assumed that B is possible for



all C; a syllogism results as before: for the terms are in the same



relative positions。 Likewise if both the relations are negative; if



the major premiss states that A does not belong to B; and the minor



premiss indicates that B may possibly belong to no C。 Through the



premisses actually taken nothing necessary results in any way; but



if the problematic premiss is converted; we shall have a syllogism。



Suppose that A belongs to no B; and B may possibly belong to no C。



Through these comes nothing necessary。 But if B is assumed to be



possible for all C (and this is true) and if the premiss AB remains as



before; we shall again have the same syllogism。 But if it be assumed



that B does not belong to any C; instead of possibly not belonging;



there cannot be a syllogism anyhow; whether the premiss AB is negative



or affirmative。 As common instances of a necessary and positive



relation we may take the terms white…animal…snow: of a necessary and



negative relation; white…animal…pitch。 Clearly then if the terms are



universal; and one of the premisses is assertoric; the other



problematic; whenever the minor premiss is problematic a syllogism



always results; only sometimes it results from the premisses that



are taken; sometimes it requires the conversion of one premiss。 We



have stated when each of these happens and the reason why。 But if



one of the relations is universal; the other particular; then whenever



the major premiss is universal and problematic; whether affirmative or



negative; and the particular is affirmative and assertoric; there will



be a perfect syllogism; just as when the terms are universal。 The



demonstration is the same as before。 But whenever the major premiss is



universal; but assertoric; not problematic; and the minor is



particular and problematic; whether both premisses are negative or



affirmative; or one is negative; the other affirmative; in all cases



there will be an imperfect syllogism。 Only some of them will be proved



per impossibile; others by the conversion of the problematic



premiss; as has been shown above。 And a syllogism will be possible



by means of conversion when the major premiss is universal and



assertoric; whether positive or negative; and the minor particular;



negative; and problematic; e。g。 if A belongs to all B or to no B;



and B may possibly not belong to some C。 For if the premiss BC is



converted in respect of possibility; a syllogism results。 But whenever



the particular premiss is assertoric and negative; there cannot be a



syllogism。 As instances of the positive relation we may take the terms



white…animal…snow; of the negative; white…animal…pitch。 For the



demonstration must be made through the indefinite nature of the



particular premiss。 But if the minor premiss is universal; and the



major particular; whether either premiss is negative or affirmative;



problematic or assertoric; nohow is a syllogism possible。 Nor is a



syllogism possible when the premisses are particular or indefinite;



whether problematic or assertoric; or the one problematic; the other



assertoric。 The demonstration is the same as above。 As instances of



the necessary and positive relation we may take the terms



animal…white…man; of the necessary and negative relation;



animal…white…garment。 It is evident then that if the major premiss



is universal; a syllogism always results; but if the minor is



universal nothing at all can ever be proved。







                                16







  Whenever one premiss is necessary; the other problematic; there will



be a syllogism when the terms are related as before; and a perfect



syllogism when the minor premiss is necessary。 If the premisses are



affirmative the conclusion will be problematic; not assertoric;



whether the premisses are universal or not: but if one is affirmative;



the other negative; when the affirmative is necessary the conclusion



will be problematic; not negative assertoric; but when the negative is



necessary the conclusion will be problematic negative; and



assertoric negative; whether the premisses are universal or not。



Possibility in the conclusion must be understood in the same manner as



before。 There cannot be an inference to the necessary negative



proposition: for 'not necessarily to belong' is different from



'necessarily not to belong'。



  If the premisses are affirmative; clearly the conclusion which



follows is not necessary。 Suppose A necessarily belongs to all B;



and let B be possible for all C。 We shall have an imperfect



syllogism to prove that A may belong to all C。 That it is imperfect is



clear from the proof: for it will be proved in the same manner as



above。 Again; let A be possible for all B; and let B necessarily



belong to all C。 We shall then have a syllogism to prove that A may



belong to all C; not that A does belong to all C: and it is perfect;



not imperfect: for it is completed directly through the original



premisses。



  But if the premisses are not similar in quality; suppose first



that the negative premiss is necessary; and let necessarily A not be



possible for any B; but let B be possible for all C。 It is necessary



then that A belongs to no C。 For suppose A to belong to all C or to



some C。 Now we assumed that A is not possible for any B。 Since then



the negative proposition is convertible; B is not possible for any



A。 But A is supposed to belong to all C or to some C。 Consequently B



will not be possible for any C or for all C。 But it was originally



laid down that B is possible for all C。 And it is clear that the



possibility of belonging can be inferred; since the fact of not



belonging is inferred。 Again; let the affirmative premiss be



necessary; and let A possibly not belong to any B; and let B



necessarily belong to all C。 The syllogism will be perfect; but it



will establish a problematic negative; not an assertoric negative。 For



the major premiss was problematic; and further it is not possible to



prove the assertoric conclusion per impossibile。 For if it were



supposed that A belongs to some C; and it is laid down that A possibly



does not belong to any B; no impossible relation between B and C



follows from these premisses。 But if the minor premiss is negative;



when it is problematic a syllogism is possible by conversion; as



above; but when it is necessary no syllogism can be formed。 Nor



again when both premisses are negative; and the minor is necessary。



The same terms as before serve both for the positive



relation…white…animal…snow; and for the negative



relation…white…animal…pitch。



  The same relation will obtain in particular syllogisms。 Whenever the



negative proposition is necessary; the conclusion will be negative



assertoric: e。g。 if it is not possible that A should belong
返回目录 上一页 下一页 回到顶部 0 0
未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!
温馨提示: 温看小说的同时发表评论,说出自己的看法和其它小伙伴们分享也不错哦!发表书评还可以获得积分和经验奖励,认真写原创书评 被采纳为精评可以获得大量金币、积分和经验奖励哦!