representative government-第68章

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nment。　It　is　a　very　shallow　view　of　the　springs　of　political　action　in　a　community　which　thinks　such　things　unimportant　because　the　number　of　those　in　a　position　actually　to　profit　by　the　concession　might　not　be　very　considerable。　That　limited　number　would　be　composed　precisely　of　those　who　have　most　moral　power　over　the　rest：　and　men　are　not　so　destitute　of　the　sense　of　collective　degradation　as　not　to　feel　the　withholding　of　an　advantage　from　even　one　person；　because　of　a　circumstance　which　they　all　have　in　common　with　him；　an　affront　to　all。　If　we　prevent　the　leading　men　of　a　community　from　standing　forth　to　the　world　as　its　chiefs　and　representatives　in　the　general　councils　of　mankind；　we　owe　it　both　to　their　legitimate　ambition；　and　to　the　just　pride　of　the　community；　to　give　them　in　return　an　equal　chance　of　occupying　the　same　prominent　position　in　a　nation　of　greater　power　and　importance。　　　Thus　far　of　the　dependencies　whose　population　is　in　a　sufficiently　advanced　state　to　be　fitted　for　representative　government。　But　there　are　others　which　have　not　attained　that　state；　and　which；　if　held　at　all；　must　be　governed　by　the　dominant　country；　or　by　persons　delegated　for　that　purpose　by　it。　This　mode　of　government　is　as　legitimate　as　any　other　if　it　is　the　one　which　in　the　existing　state　of　civilisation　of　the　subject　people　most　facilitates　their　transition　to　a　higher　stage　of　improvement。　There　are；　as　we　have　already　seen；　conditions　of　society　in　which　a　vigorous　despotism　is　in　itself　the　best　mode　of　government　for　training　the　people　in　what　is　specifically　wanting　to　render　them　capable　of　a　higher　civilisation。　There　are　others；　in　which　the　mere　fact　of　despotism　has　indeed　no　beneficial　effect；　the　lessons　which　it　teaches　having　already　been　only　too　completely　learnt；　but　in　which；　there　being　no　spring　of　spontaneous　improvement　in　the　people　themselves；　their　almost　only　hope　of　making　any　steps　in　advance　depends　on　the　chances　of　a　good　despot。　Under　a　native　despotism；　a　good　despot　is　a　rare　and　transitory　accident：　but　when　the　dominion　they　are　under　is　that　of　a　more　civilised　people；　that　people　ought　to　be　able　to　supply　it　constantly。　The　ruling　country　ought　to　be　able　to　do　for　its　subjects　all　that　could　be　done　by　a　succession　of　absolute　monarchs；　guaranteed　by　irresistible　force　against　the　precariousness　of　tenure　attendant　on　barbarous　despotisms；　and　qualified　by　their　genius　to　anticipate　all　that　experience　has　taught　to　the　more　advanced　nation。　Such　is　the　ideal　rule　of　a　free　people　over　a　barbarous　or　semi…barbarous　one。　We　need　not　expect　to　see　that　ideal　realised；　but　unless　some　approach　to　it　is；　the　rulers　are　guilty　of　a　dereliction　of　the　highest　moral　trust　which　can　devolve　upon　a　nation：　and　if　they　do　not　even　'him　at　it；　they　are　selfish　usurpers；　on　a　par　in　criminality　with　any　of　those　whose　ambition　and　rapacity　have　sported　from　age　to　age　with　the　destiny　of　masses　of　mankind。　　　As　it　is　already　a　common；　and　is　rapidly　tending　to　become　the　universal；　condition　of　the　more　backward　populations；　to　be　either　held　in　direct　subjection　by　the　more　advanced；　or　to　be　under　their　complete　political　ascendancy；　there　are　in　this　age　of　the　world　few　more　important　problems　than　how　to　organise　this　rule；　so　as　to　make　it　a　good　instead　of　an　evil　to　the　subject　people；　providing　them　with　the　best　attainable　present　government；　and　with　the　conditions　most　favourable　to　future　permanent　improvement。　But　the　mode　of　fitting　the　government　for　this　purpose　is　by　no　means　so　well　understood　as　the　conditions　of　good　government　in　a　people　capable　of　governing　themselves。　We　may　even　say　that　it　is　not　understood　at　all。　　　The　thing　appears　perfectly　easy　to　superficial　observers。　If　India　（for　example）　is　not　fit　to　govern　itself；　all　that　seems　to　them　required　is　that　there　should　be　a　minister　to　govern　it：　and　that　this　minister；　like　all　other　British　ministers；　should　be　responsible　to　the　British　Parliament。　Unfortunately　this；　though　the　simplest　mode　of　attempting　to　govern　a　dependency；　is　about　the　worst；　and　betrays　in　its　advocates　a　total　want　of　comprehension　of　the　conditions　of　good　government。　To　govern　a　country　under　responsibility　to　the　people　of　that　country；　and　to　govern　one　country　under　responsibility　to　the　people　of　another；　are　two　very　different　things。　What　makes　the　excellence　of　the　first　is　that　freedom　is　preferable　to　despotism：　but　the　last　is　despotism。　The　only　choice　the　case　admits　is　a　choice　of　despotisms：　and　it　is　not　certain　that　the　despotism　of　twenty　millions　is　necessarily　better　than　that　of　a　few；　or　of　one。　But　it　is　quite　certain　that　the　despotism　of　those　who　neither　hear；　nor　see；　nor　know　anything　about　their　subjects；　has　many　chances　of　being　worse　than　that　of　those　who　do。　It　is　not　usually　thought　that　the　immediate　agents　of　authority　govern　better　because　they　govern　in　the　name　of　an　absent　master；　and　of　one　who　has　a　thousand　more　pressing　interests　to　attend　to。　The　master　may　hold　them　to　a　strict　responsibility；　enforced　by　heavy　penalties；　but　it　is　very　questionable　if　those　penalties　will　often　fall　in　the　right　place。　　　It　is　always　under　great　difficulties；　and　very　imperfectly；　that　a　country　can　be　governed　by　foreigners；　even　when　there　is　no　extreme　disparity；　in　habits　and　ideas；　between　the　rulers　and　the　ruled。　Foreigners　do　not　feel　with　the　people。　They　cannot　judge；　by　the　light　in　which　a　thing　appears　to　their　own　minds；　or　the　manner　in　which　it　affects　their　feelings；　how　it　will　affect　the　feelings　or　appear　to　the　minds　of　the　subject　population。　What　a　native　of　the　country；　of　average　practical　ability；　knows　as　it　were　by　instinct；　they　have　to　learn　slowly；　and　after　all　imperfectly；　by　study　and　experience。　The　laws；　the　customs；　the　social　relations；　for　which　they　have　to　legislate；　instead　of　being　familiar　to　them　from　childhood；　are　all　strange　to　them。　For　most　of　their　detailed　knowledge　they　must　depend　on　the　information　of　natives；　and　it　is　difficult　for　them　to　know　whom　to　trust。　They　are　feared；　suspected；　probably　disliked　by　the　population；　seldom　sought　by　them　except　for　interested　purposes；　and　they　are　prone　to　think　that　the　servilely　submissive　are　the　trustworthy。　Their　danger　is　of　despising　the　natives；　that　of　the　natives　is　of　disbelieving　that　anything　the　strangers　do　can　be　intended　for　their　good。　These　are　but　a　part　of　the　difficulties　that　any　rulers　have　to　struggle　with　who　honestly　attempt　to　govern　well　a　country　in　which　they　are　foreigners。　To　overcome　these　difficulties　in　any　degree　will　always　be　a　work　of　much　labour；　requiring　a　very　superior　degree　of　capacity　in　the　chief　administrators；　and　a　high　average　among　the　subordinates：　and　the　best　organisation　of　such　a　government　is　that　which　will　best　ensure　the　labour；　develop　the　capacity；　and　place　the　highest　specimens　of　it　in　the　situations　of　greatest　trust。　Responsibility　to　an　authority　which　bas　gone　through　none　of　the　labour；　acquired　none　of　the　capacity；　and　for　the　most　part　is　not　even　aware　that　either；　in　any　peculiar　degree；　is　required；　cannot　be　regarded　as　a　very　effectual　expedient　for　accomplishing　these　ends。　　　The　government　of　a　people　by　itself　has　a　meaning　and　a　reality；　but　such　a　thing　as　government　of　one　people　by　another　does　not　and　cannot　exist。　One　people　may　keep　another　as　a　warren　or　preserve　for　its　own　use；　a　place　to　make　money　in；　a　human　cattle　farm　to　be　worked　for　the　profit　of　its　own　inhabitants。　But　if　the　good　of　the　governed　is　the　proper　business　of　a　government；　it　is　utterly　impossible　that　a　people　should　directly　attend　to　it。　The　utmost　they　can　do　is　to　give　some　of　their　best　men　a　commission　to　look　after　it；　to　whom　the　opinion　of　their　own　country　can　neither　be　much　of　a　guide　in　the　performance　of　their　duty；　nor　a　competent　judge　of　the　mode　in　which　it　has　been　performed。　Let　any　one　consider　how　the　English　themselves　would　be　governed　if　they　knew　and　cared　no　more　about　their　own　affairs　than　they　know　and　care　about　the　affairs　of　the　Hindoos。　Even　this　comparison　gives　no　adequate　idea　of　the　state　of　the　case：　for　a　peo