representative government-第60章

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do　not　act　at　the　centre；　but　in　the　locality：　and　however　inferior　the　local　public　may　be　to　the　central；　it　is　the　local　public　alone　which　has　any　opportunity　of　watching　them；　and　it　is　the　local　opinion　alone　which　either　acts　directly　upon　their　own　conduct；　or　calls　the　attention　of　the　government　to　the　points　in　which　they　may　require　correction。　It　is　but　in　extreme　cases　that　the　general　opinion　of　the　country　is　brought　to　bear　at　all　upon　details　of　local　administration；　and　still　more　rarely　has　it　the　means　of　deciding　upon　them　with　any　just　appreciation　of　the　case。　Now；　the　local　opinion　necessarily　acts　far　more　forcibly　upon　purely　local　administrators。　They；　in　the　natural　course　of　things；　are　permanent　residents；　not　expecting　to　be　withdrawn　from　the　place　when　they　cease　to　exercise　authority　in　it；　and　their　authority　itself　depends；　by　supposition；　on　the　will　of　the　local　public。　I　need　not　dwell　on　the　deficiencies　of　the　central　authority　in　detailed　knowledge　of　local　persons　and　things；　and　the　too　great　engrossment　of　its　time　and　thoughts　by　other　concerns；　to　admit　of　its　acquiring　the　quantity　and　quality　of　local　knowledge　necessary　even　for　deciding　on　complaints；　and　enforcing　responsibility　from　so　great　a　number　of　local　agents。　In　the　details　of　management；　therefore；　the　local　bodies　will　generally　have　the　advantage；　but　in　comprehension　of　the　principles　even　of　purely　local　management；　the　superiority　of　the　central　government；　when　rightly　constituted；　ought　to　be　prodigious：　not　only　by　reason　of　the　probably　great　personal　superiority　of　the　individuals　composing　it；　and　the　multitude　of　thinkers　and　writers　who　are　at　all　times　engaged　in　pressing　useful　ideas　upon　their　notice；　but　also　because　the　knowledge　and　experience　of　any　local　authority　is　but　local　knowledge　and　experience；　confined　to　their　own　part　of　the　country　and　its　modes　of　management；　whereas　the　central　government　has　the　means　of　knowing　all　that　is　to　be　learnt　from　the　united　experience　of　the　whole　kingdom；　with　the　addition　of　easy　access　to　that　of　foreign　countries。　　　The　practical　conclusion　from　these　premises　is　not　difficult　to　draw。　The　authority　which　is　most　conversant　with　principles　should　be　supreme　over　principles；　while　that　which　is　most　competent　in　details　should　have　the　details　left　to　it。　The　principal　business　of　the　central　authority　should　be　to　give　instruction；　of　the　local　authority　to　apply　it。　Power　may　be　localised；　but　knowledge；　to　be　most　useful；　must　be　centralised；　there　must　be　somewhere　a　focus　at　which　all　its　scattered　rays　are　collected；　that　the　broken　and　coloured　lights　which　exist　elsewhere　may　find　there　what　is　necessary　to　complete　and　purify　them。　To　every　branch　of　local　administration　which　affects　the　general　interest　there　should　be　a　corresponding　central　organ；　either　a　minister；　or　some　specially　appointed　functionary　under　him；　even　if　that　functionary　does　no　more　than　collect　information　from　all　quarters；　and　bring　the　experience　acquired　in　one　locality　to　the　knowledge　of　another　where　it　is　wanted。　But　there　is　also　something　more　than　this　for　the　central　authority　to　do。　It　ought　to　keep　open　a　perpetual　communication　with　the　localities：　informing　itself　by　their　experience；　and　them　by　its　own；　giving　advice　freely　when　asked；　volunteering　it　when　seen　to　be　required；　compelling　publicity　and　recordation　of　proceedings；　and　enforcing　obedience　to　every　general　law　which　the　legislature　has　laid　down　on　the　subject　of　local　management。　　　That　some　such　laws　ought　to　be　laid　down　few　are　likely　to　deny。　The　localities　may　be　allowed　to　mismanage　their　own　interests；　but　not　to　prejudice　those　of　others；　nor　violate　those　principles　of　justice　between　one　person　and　another　of　which　it　is　the　duty　of　the　State　to　maintain　the　rigid　observance。　If　the　local　majority　attempts　to　oppress　the　minority；　or　one　class　another；　the　State　is　bound　to　interpose。　For　example；　all　local　rates　ought　to　be　voted　exclusively　by　the　local　representative　body；　but　that　body；　though　elected　solely　by　rate…payers；　may　raise　its　revenues　by　imposts　of　such　a　kind；　or　assess　them　in　such　a　manner；　as　to　throw　an　unjust　share　of　the　burden　on　the　poor；　the　rich；　or　some　particular　class　of　the　population：　it　is　the　duty；　therefore；　of　the　legislature；　while　leaving　the　mere　amount　of　the　local　taxes　to　the　discretion　of　the　local　body；　to　lay　down　authoritatively　the　modes　of　taxation；　and　rules　of　assessment；　which　alone　the　localities　shall　be　permitted　to　use。　　　Again；　in　the　administration　of　public　charity　the　industry　and　morality　of　the　whole　labouring　population　depend；　to　a　most　serious　extent；　upon　adherence　to　certain　fixed　principles　in　awarding　relief。　Though　it　belongs　essentially　to　the　local　functionaries　to　determine　who；　according　to　those　principles；　is　entitled　to　be　relieved；　the　national　Parliament　is　the　proper　authority　to　prescribe　the　principles　themselves；　and　it　would　neglect　a　most　important　part　of　its　duty　if　it　did　not；　in　a　matter　of　such　grave　national　concern；　lay　down　imperative　rules；　and　make　effectual　provision　that　those　rules　should　not　be　departed　from。　What　power　of　actual　interference　with　the　local　administrators　it　may　be　necessary　to　retain；　for　the　due　enforcement　of　the　laws；　is　a　question　of　detail　into　which　it　would　be　useless　to　enter。　The　laws　themselves　will　naturally　define　the　penalties；　and　fix　the　mode　of　their　enforcement。　It　may　be　requisite；　to　meet　extreme　cases；　that　the　power　of　the　central　authority　should　extend　to　dissolving　the　local　representative　council；　or　dismissing　the　local　executive：　but　not　to　making　new　appointments；　or　suspending　the　local　institutions。　Where　Parliament　has　not　interfered；　neither　ought　any　branch　of　the　executive　to　interfere　with　authority；　but　as　an　adviser　and　critic；　an　enforcer　of　the　laws；　and　a　denouncer　to　Parliament　or　the　local　constituencies　of　conduct　which　it　deems　condemnable；　the　functions　of　the　executive　are　of　the　greatest　possible　value。　　　Some　may　think　that　however　much　the　central　authority　surpasses　the　local　in　knowledge　of　the　principles　of　administration；　the　great　object　which　has　been　so　much　insisted　on；　the　social　and　political　education　of　the　citizens；　requires　that　they　should　be　left　to　manage　these　matters　by　their　own；　however　imperfect；　lights。　To　this　it　might　be　answered；　that　the　education　of　the　citizens　is　not　the　only　thing　to　be　considered；　government　and　administration　do　not　exist　for　that　alone；　great　as　its　importance　is。　But　the　objection　shows　a　very　imperfect　understanding　of　the　function　of　popular　institutions　as　a　means　of　political　instruction。　It　is　but　a　poor　education　that　associates　ignorance　with　ignorance；　and　leaves　them；　if　they　care　for　knowledge；　to　grope　their　way　to　it　without　help；　and　to　do　without　it　if　they　do　not。　What　is　wanted　is；　the　means　of　making　ignorance　aware　of　itself；　and　able　to　profit　by　knowledge；　accustoming　minds　which　know　only　routine　to　act　upon；　and　feel　the　value　of　principles：　teaching　them　to　compare　different　modes　of　action；　and　learn；　by　the　use　of　their　reason；　to　distinguish　the　best。　When　we　desire　to　have　a　good　school；　we　do　not　eliminate　the　teacher。　The　old　remark；　〃as　the　schoolmaster　is；　so　will　be　the　school；〃　is　as　true　of　the　indirect　schooling　of　grown　people　by　public　business　as　of　the　schooling　of　youth　in　academies　and　colleges。　A　government　which　attempts　to　do　everything　is　aptly　compared　by　M。　Charles　de　Remusat　to　a　schoolmaster　who　does　all　the　pupils'　tasks　for　them；　he　may　be　very　popular　with　the　pupils；　but　he　will　teach　them　little。　A　government；　on　the　other　hand；　which　neither　does　anything　itself　that　can　possibly　be　done　by　any　one　else；　nor　shows　any　one　else　how　to　do　anything；　is　like　a　school　in　which　there　is　no　schoolmaster；　but　only　pupil　teachers　who　have　never　themselves　been　taught。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　16　　　　　　　　Of　Nationality；　as　connected　with　Representative　Government。

　　A　PORTION　of　mankind　may　be　said　to　constitute　a　Nationality　if　they　are　united　among　themselves　by　common　sympathies　which　do　not　exist　between　them