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representative government-第50章

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consuls makes it desirable there should be two Chambers: that neither of them may be exposed to the corrupting influence of undivided power; even for the space of a single year。 One of the most indispensable requisites in the practical conduct of politics; especially in the management of free institutions; is conciliation: a readiness to compromise; a willingness to concede something to opponents; and to shape good measures so as to be as little offensive as possible to persons of opposite views; and of this salutary habit; the mutual give and take (as it has been called) between two Houses is a perpetual school; useful as such even now; and its utility would probably be even more felt in a more democratic constitution of the Legislature。   But the Houses need not both be of the same composition; they may be intended as a check on one another。 One being supposed democratic; the other will naturally be constituted with a view to its being some restraint upon the democracy。 But its efficacy in this respect wholly depends on the social support which it can command outside the House。 An assembly which does not rest on the basis of some great power in the country is ineffectual against one which does。 An aristocratic House is only powerful in an aristocratic state of society。 The House of Lords was once the strongest power in our Constitution; and the Commons only a checking body: but this was when the Barons were almost the only power out of doors。 I cannot believe that; in a really democratic state of society; the House of Lords would be of any practical value as a moderator of democracy。 When the force on one side is feeble in comparison with that on the other; the way to give it effect is not to draw both out in line; and muster their strength in open field over against one another。 Such tactics would ensure the utter defeat of the less powerful。 It can only act to advantage by not holding itself apart; and compelling every one to declare himself either with or against it; but taking a position among; rather than in opposition to; the crowd; and drawing to itself the elements most capable of allying themselves with it on any given point; not appearing at all as an antagonist body; to provoke a general rally against it; but working as one of the elements in a mixed mass; infusing its leaven; and often making what would be the weaker part the stronger; by the addition of its influence。 The really moderating power in a democratic constitution must act in and through the democratic House。   That there should be; in every polity; a centre of resistance to the predominant power in the Constitution… and in a democratic constitution; therefore; a nucleus of resistance to the democracy… I have already maintained; and I regard it as a fundamental maxim of government。 If any people; who possess a democratic representation; are; from their historical antecedents; more willing to tolerate such a centre of resistance in the form of a Second Chamber or House of Lords than in any other shape; this constitutes a stronger reason for having it in that shape。 But it does not appear to me the best shape in itself; nor by any means the most efficacious for its object。 If there are two Houses; one considered to represent the people; the other to represent only a class; or not to be representative at all; I cannot think that where democracy is the ruling power in society the Second House would have any real ability to resist even the aberrations of the first。 It might be suffered to exist in deference to habit and association; but not as an effective check。 If it exercised an independent will; it would be required to do so in the same general spirit as the other House; to be equally democratic with it; and to content itself with correcting the accidental oversights of the more popular branch of the legislature; or competing with it in popular measures。   The practicability of any real check to the ascendancy of the majority depends henceforth on the distribution of strength in the most popular branch of the governing body; and I have indicated the mode in which; to the best of my judgment; a balance of forces might most advantageously be established there。 I have also pointed out; that even if the numerical majority were allowed to exercise complete predominance by means of a corresponding majority in Parliament; yet if minorities also are permitted to enjoy the equal right due to them on strictly democratic principles; of being represented proportionally to their numbers; this provision will ensure the perpetual presence in the House by the same popular title as its other members; of so many of the first intellects in the country; that without being in any way banded apart; or invested with any invidious prerogative; this portion of the national representation will have a personal weight much more than in proportion to its numerical strength; and will afford; in a most effective form; the moral centre of resistance which is needed。 A Second Chamber; therefore; is not required for this purpose; and would not contribute to it; but might even; in some conceivable modes impede its attainment。 If; however; for the other reasons already mentioned; the decision were taken that there should be such a Chamber; it is desirable that it should be composed of elements which; without being open to the imputation of class interests adverse to the majority; would incline it to oppose itself to the class interests of the majority; and qualify it to raise its voice with authority against their errors and weaknesses。 These conditions evidently are not found in a body constituted in the manner of our House of Lords。 So soon as conventional rank and individual riches no longer overawe the democracy; a House of Lords becomes insignificant。   Of all principles on which a wisely conservative body; destined to moderate and regulate democratic ascendancy; could possibly be constructed; the best seems to be that exemplified in the Roman Senate; itself the most consistently prudent and sagacious body that ever administered public affairs。 The deficiencies of a democratic assembly; which represents the general public; are the deficiencies of the public itself; want of special training and knowledge。 The appropriate corrective is to associate with it a body of which special training and knowledge should be the characteristics。 If one House represents popular feeling; the other should represent personal merit; tested and guaranteed by actual public service; and fortified by practical experience。 If one is the People's Chamber; the other should be the Chamber of Statesmen; a council composed of all living public men who have passed through important political offices or employments。 Such a Chamber would be fitted for much more than to be a merely moderating body。 It would not be exclusively a check; but also an impelling force。 In its hands the power of holding the people back would be vested in those most competent; and who would generally be most inclined; to lead them forward in any right course。 The council to whom the task would be entrusted of rectifying the people's mistakes would not represent a class believed to be opposed to their interest; but would consist of their own natural leaders in the path of progress。 No mode of composition could approach to this in giving weight and efficacy to their function of moderators。 It would be impossible to cry down a body always foremost in promoting improvements as a mere obstructive body; whatever amount of mischief it might obstruct。   Were the place vacant in England for such a Senate (I need scarcely say that this is a mere hypothesis); it might be composed of some such elements as the following。 All who were or had been members of the Legislative Commission described in a former chapter; and which I regard as an indispensable ingredient in a well…constituted popular government。 All who were or had been Chief justices; or heads of any of the superior courts of law or equity。 All who had for five years filled the office of puisne judge。 All who had held for two years any Cabinet office: but these should also be eligible to the House of Commons; and if elected members of it; their peerage or senatorial office should be held in suspense。 Th
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