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trust　attaching　to　all　novelties　which　have　not　been　sufficiently　canvassed　to　make　generally　manifest　all　the　pros　and　cons　of　the　question。　The　only　serious　obstacle　is　the　unfamiliarity：　this　indeed　is　a　formidable　one；　for　the　imagination　much　more　easily　reconciles　itself　to　a　great　alteration　in　substance；　than　to　a　very　small　one　in　names　and　forms。　But　unfamiliarity　is　a　disadvantage　which；　when　there　is　any　real　value　in　an　idea；　it　only　requires　time　to　remove。　And　in　these　days　of　discussion；　and　generally　awakened　interest　in　improvement；　what　formerly　was　the　work　of　centuries；　often　requires　only　years。

　　Since　the　first　publication　of　this　Treatise；　several　adverse　criticisms　have　been　made　on　Mr。　Hare's　plan；　which　indicate　at　least　a　careful　examination　of　it；　and　a　more　intelligent　consideration　than　had　previously　been　given　to　its　pretensions。　This　is　the　natural　progress　of　the　discussion　of　great　improvements。　They　are　at　first　met　by　a　blind　prejudice；　and　by　arguments　to　which　only　blind　prejudice　could　attach　any　value。　As　the　prejudice　weakens；　the　arguments　it　employs　for　some　time　increase　in　strength；　since；　the　plan　being　better　understood；　its　inevitable　inconveniences；　and　the　circumstances　which　militate　against　its　at　once　producing　all　the　benefits　it　is　intrinsically　capable　of；　come　to　light　along　with　its　merits。　But　of　all　the　objections；　having　any　semblance　of　reason；　which　have　come　under　my　notice；　there　is　not　one　which　had　not　been　foreseen；　considered；　and　canvassed　by　the　supporters　of　the　plan；　and　found　either　unreal　or　easily　surmountable。　　　The　most　serious；　in　appearance；　of　the　objections　may　be　the　most　briefly　answered；　the　assumed　impossibility　of　guarding　against　fraud；　or　suspicion　of　fraud；　in　the　operations　of　the　Central　Office。　Publicity；　and　complete　liberty　of　inspecting　the　voting　papers　after　the　election；　were　the　securities　provided；　but　these；　it　is　maintained；　would　be　unavailing；　because；　to　check　the　returns；　a　voter　would　have　to　go　over　all　the　work　that　had　been　done　by　the　staff　of　clerks。　This　would　be　a　very　weighty　objection；　if　there　were　any　necessity　that　the　returns　should　be　verified　individually　by　every　voter。　All　that　a　simple　voter　could　be　expected　to　do　in　the　way　of　verification　would　be　to　check　the　use　made　of　his　own　voting　paper；　for　which　purpose　every　paper　would　be　returned；　after　a　proper　interval；　to　the　place　from　whence　it　came。　But　what　he　could　not　do　would　be　done　for　him　by　the　unsuccessful　candidates　and　their　agents。　Those　among　the　defeated　who　thought　that　they　ought　to　have　been　returned　would；　singly　or　a　number　together；　employ　an　agency　for　verifying　the　process　of　the　election；　and　if　they　detected　material　error；　the　documents　would　be　referred　to　a　Committee　of　the　House　of　Commons；　by　whom　the　entire　electoral　operations　of　the　nation　would　be　examined　and　verified；　at　a　tenth　part　the　expense　of　time　and　money　necessary　for　the　scrutiny　of　a　single　return　before　an　Election　Committee　under　the　system　now　in　force。　　　Assuming　the　plan　to　be　workable；　two　modes　have　been　alleged　in　which　its　benefits　might　be　frustrated；　and　injurious　consequences　produced　in　lieu　of　them。　First；　it　is　said　that　undue　power　would　be　given　to　knots　or　cliques；　sectarian　combinations；　associations　for　special　objects；　such　as　the　Maine　Law　League；　the　Ballot　or　Liberation　Society；　or　bodies　united　by　class　interests　or　community　of　religious　persuasion。　It　is　in　the　second　place　objected　that　the　system　would　admit　of　being　worked　for　party　purposes。　A　central　organ　of　each　political　party　would　send　its　list　of　658　candidates　all　through　the　country；　to　be　voted　for　by　the　whole　of　its　supporters　in　every　constituency。　Their　votes　would　far　outnumber　those　which　could　ever　be　obtained　by　any　independent　candidate。　The　〃ticket〃　system；　it　is　contended；　would；　as　it　does　in　America；　operate　solely　in　favour　of　the　great　organised　parties；　whose　tickets　would　be　accepted　blindly；　and　voted　for　in　their　integrity；　and　would　hardly　ever　be　outvoted；　except　occasionally；　by　the　sectarian　groups；　or　knots　of　men　bound　together　by　a　common　crotchet　who　have　been　already　spoken　of。　　　The　answer　to　this　appears　to　be　conclusive。　No　one　pretends　that　under　Mr。　Hare's　or　any　other　plan　organisation　would　cease　to　be　an　advantage。　Scattered　elements　are　always　at　a　disadvantage　compared　with　organised　bodies。　As　Mr。　Hare's　plan　cannot　alter　the　nature　of　things；　we　must　expect　that　all　parties　or　sections；　great　or　small；　which　possess　organisation；　would　avail　themselves　of　it　to　the　utmost　to　strengthen　their　influence。　But　under　the　existing　system　those　influences　are　everything。　The　scattered　elements　are　absolutely　nothing。　The　voters　who　are　neither　bound　to　the　great　political　nor　to　any　of　the　little　sectarian　divisions　have　no　means　of　making　their　votes　available。　Mr。　Hare's　plan　gives　them　the　means。　They　might　be　more；　or　less；　dexterous　in　using　it。　They　might　obtain　their　share　of　influence；　or　much　less　than　their　share。　But　whatever　they　did　acquire　would　be　clear　gain。　And　when　it　is　assumed　that　every　petty　interest；　or　combination　for　a　petty　object；　would　give　itself　an　organisation；　why　should　we　suppose　that　the　great　interest　of　national　intellect　and　character　would　alone　remain　unorganised？　If　there　would　be　Temperance　tickets；　and　Ragged　School　tickets；　and　the　like；　would　not　one　public…spirited　person　in　a　constituency　be　sufficient　to　put　forth　a　〃personal　merit〃　ticket；　and　circulate　it　through　a　whole　neighbourhood？　And　might　not　a　few　such　persons；　meeting　in　London；　select　from　the　list　of　candidates　the　most　distinguished　names；　without　regard　to　technical　divisions　of　opinion；　and　publish　them　at　a　trifling　expense　through　all　the　constituencies？　It　must　be　remembered　that　the　influence　of　the　two　great　parties；　under　the　present　mode　of　election；　is　unlimited：　in　Mr。　Hare's　scheme　it　would　be　great；　but　confined　within　bounds。　Neither　they；　nor　any　of　the　smaller　knots；　would　be　able　to　elect　more　members　than　in　proportion　to　the　relative　number　of　their　adherents。　The　ticket　system　in　America　operates　under　conditions　the　reverse　of　this。　In　America　electors　vote　for　the　party　ticket；　because　the　election　goes　by　a　mere　majority；　and　a　vote　for　any　one　who　is　certain　not　to　obtain　the　majority　is　thrown　away。　But；　on　Mr。　Hare's　system；　a　vote　given　to　a　person　of　known　worth　has　almost　as　much　chance　of　obtaining　its　object　as　one　given　to　a　party　candidate。　It　might　be　hoped；　therefore；　that　every　Liberal　or　Conservative；　who　was　anything　besides　a　Liberal　or　a　Conservative…　who　had　any　preferences　of　his　own　in　addition　to　those　of　his　party…　would　scratch　through　the　names　of　the　more　obscure　and　insignificant　party　candidates；　and　inscribe　in　their　stead　some　of　the　men　who　are　an　honour　to　the　nation。　And　the　probability　of　this　fact　would　operate　as　a　strong　inducement　with　those　who　drew　up　the　party　lists　not　to　confine　themselves　to　pledged　party　men；　but　to　include　along　with　these；　in　their　respective　tickets；　such　of　the　national　notabilities　as　were　more　in　sympathy　with　their　side　than　with　the　opposite。　　　The　real　difficulty；　for　it　is　not　to　be　dissembled　that　there　is　a　difficulty；　is　that　the　independent　voters；　those　who　are　desirous　of　voting　for　unpatronised　persons　of　merit；　would　be　apt　to　put　down　the　names　of　a　few　such　persons；　and　to　fill　up　the　remainder　of　their　list　with　mere　party　candidates；　thus　helping　to　swell　the　numbers　against　those　by　whom　they　would　prefer　to　be　represented。　There　would　be　an　easy　remedy　for　this；　should　it　be　necessary　to　resort　to　it；　namely；　to　impose　a　limit　to　the　number　of　secondary　or　contingent　votes。　No　voter　is　likely　to　have　an　independent　preference；　grounded　on　knowledge；　for　658；　or　even　for　100　candidates。　There　would　be　little　objection　to　his　being　limited　to　twenty；　fifty；　or　whatever　might　be　the　number　in　the　selection　of　whom　there　was　some　probability　that　his　own　choice　would　be　exercised…that　he　would　vote　as　an　individual；　and　not　as　one　of　the　mere　rank　and　file　of　a　party。　But　even　without　this　restriction；　the　evil　would　be　l