representative government-第11章

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the　power　of　taxation；　and　the　supreme　legislative　as　well　as　executive　authority。　Were　he　to　act　thus；　and　so　far　abdicate　as　a　despot；　he　would　do　away　with　a　considerable　part　of　the　evils　characteristic　of　despotism。　Political　activity　and　capacity　for　public　affairs　would　no　longer　be　prevented　from　growing　up　in　the　body　of　the　nation；　and　a　public　opinion　would　form　itself　not　the　mere　echo　of　the　government。　But　such　improvement　would　be　the　beginning　of　new　difficulties。　This　public　opinion；　independent　of　the　monarch's　dictation；　must　be　either　with　him　or　against　him；　if　not　the　one；　it　will　be　the　other。　All　governments　must　displease　many　persons；　and　these　having　now　regular　organs；　and　being　able　to　express　their　sentiments；　opinions　adverse　to　the　measures　of　government　would　often　be　expressed。　What　is　the　monarch　to　do　when　these　unfavourable　opinions　happen　to　be　in　the　majority？　Is　he　to　alter　his　course？　Is　he　to　defer　to　the　nation？　If　so；　he　is　no　longer　a　despot；　but　a　constitutional　king；　an　organ　or　first　minister　of　the　people；　distinguished　only　by　being　irremovable。　If　not；　he　must　either　put　down　opposition　by　his　despotic　power；　or　there　will　arise　a　permanent　antagonism　between　the　people　and　one　man；　which　can　have　but　one　possible　ending。　Not　even　a　religious　principle　of　passive　obedience　and　〃right　divine〃　would　long　ward　off　the　natural　consequences　of　such　a　position。　The　monarch　would　have　to　succumb；　and　conform　to　the　conditions　of　constitutional　royalty；　or　give　place　to　some　one　who　would。　The　despotism；　being　thus　chiefly　nominal；　would　possess　few　of　the　advantages　supposed　to　belong　to　absolute　monarchy；　while　it　would　realise　in　a　very　imperfect　degree　those　of　a　free　government；　since　however　great　an　amount　of　liberty　the　citizens　might　practically　enjoy；　they　could　never　forget　that　they　held　it　on　sufferance；　and　by　a　concession　which　under　the　existing　constitution　of　the　state　might　at　any　moment　be　resumed；　that　they　were　legally　slaves；　though　of　a　prudent；　or　indulgent；　master。　　　It　is　not　much　to　be　wondered　at　if　impatient　or　disappointed　reformers；　groaning　under　the　impediments　opposed　to　the　most　salutary　public　improvements　by　the　ignorance；　the　indifference；　the　intractableness；　the　perverse　obstinacy　of　a　people；　and　the　corrupt　combinations　of　selfish　private　interests　armed　with　the　powerful　weapons　afforded　by　free　institutions；　should　at　times　sigh　for　a　strong　hand　to　bear　down　all　these　obstacles；　and　compel　a　recalcitrant　people　to　be　better　governed。　But　（setting　aside　the　fact；　that　for　one　despot　who　now　and　then　reforms　an　abuse；　there　are　ninety…nine　who　do　nothing　but　create　them）　those　who　look　in　any　such　direction　for　the　realisation　of　their　hopes　leave　out　of　the　idea　of　good　government　its　principal　element；　the　improvement　of　the　people　themselves。　One　of　the　benefits　of　freedom　is　that　under　it　the　ruler　cannot　pass　by　the　people's　minds；　and　amend　their　affairs　for　them　without　amending　them。　If　it　were　possible　for　the　people　to　be　well　governed　in　spite　of　themselves；　their　good　government　would　last　no　longer　than　the　freedom　of　a　people　usually　lasts　who　have　been　liberated　by　foreign　arms　without　their　own　co…operation。　It　is　true；　a　despot　may　educate　the　people；　and　to　do　so　really；　would　be　the　best　apology　for　his　despotism。　But　any　education　which　aims　at　making　human　beings　other　than　machines；　in　the　long　run　makes　them　claim　to　have　the　control　of　their　own　actions。　The　leaders　of　French　philosophy　in　the　eighteenth　century　had　been　educated　by　the　Jesuits。　Even　Jesuit　education；　it　seems；　was　sufficiently　real　to　call　forth　the　appetite　for　freedom。　Whatever　invigorates　the　faculties；　in　however　small　a　measure；　creates　an　increased　desire　for　their　more　unimpeded　exercise；　and　a　popular　education　is　a　failure；　if　it　educates　the　people　for　any　state　but　that　which　it　will　certainly　induce　them　to　desire；　and　most　probably　to　demand。　　　I　am　far　from　condemning；　in　cases　of　extreme　exigency；　the　assumption　of　absolute　power　in　the　form　of　a　temporary　dictatorship。　Free　nations　have；　in　times　of　old；　conferred　such　power　by　their　own　choice；　as　a　necessary　medicine　for　diseases　of　the　body　politic　which　could　not　be　got　rid　of　by　less　violent　means。　But　its　acceptance；　even　for　a　time　strictly　limited；　can　only　be　excused；　if；　like　Solon　or　Pittacus；　the　dictator　employs　the　whole　power　he　assumes　in　removing　the　obstacles　which　debar　the　nation　from　the　enjoyment　of　freedom。　A　good　despotism　is　an　altogether　false　ideal；　which　practically　（except　as　a　means　to　some　temporary　purpose）　becomes　the　most　senseless　and　dangerous　of　chimeras。　Evil　for　evil；　a　good　despotism；　in　a　country　at　all　advanced　in　civilisation；　is　more　noxious　than　a　bad　one；　for　it　is　far　more　relaxing　and　enervating　to　the　thoughts；　feelings；　and　energies　of　the　people。　The　despotism　of　Augustus　prepared　the　Romans　for　Tiberius。　If　the　whole　tone　of　their　character　had　not　first　been　prostrated　by　nearly　two　generations　of　that　mild　slavery；　they　would　probably　have　had　spirit　enough　left　to　rebel　against　the　more　odious　one。

　　There　is　no　difficulty　in　showing　that　the　ideally　best　form　of　government　is　that　in　which　the　sovereignty；　or　supreme　controlling　power　in　the　last　resort；　is　vested　in　the　entire　aggregate　of　the　community；　every　citizen　not　only　having　a　voice　in　the　exercise　of　that　ultimate　sovereignty；　but　being；　at　least　occasionally；　called　on　to　take　an　actual　part　in　the　government；　by　the　personal　discharge　of　some　public　function；　local　or　general。　　　To　test　this　proposition；　it　has　to　be　examined　in　reference　to　the　two　branches　into　which；　as　pointed　out　in　the　last　chapter；　the　inquiry　into　the　goodness　of　a　government　conveniently　divides　itself；　namely；　how　far　it　promotes　the　good　management　of　the　affairs　of　society　by　means　of　the　existing　faculties；　moral；　intellectual；　and　active；　of　its　various　members；　and　what　is　its　effect　in　improving　or　deteriorating　those　faculties。　　　The　ideally　best　form　of　government；　it　is　scarcely　necessary　to　say；　does　not　mean　one　which　is　practicable　or　eligible　in　all　states　of　civilisation；　but　the　one　which；　in　the　circumstances　in　which　it　is　practicable　and　eligible；　is　attended　with　the　greatest　amount　of　beneficial　consequences；　immediate　and　prospective。　A　completely　popular　government　is　the　only　polity　which　can　make　out　any　claim　to　this　character。　It　is　pre…eminent　in　both　the　departments　between　which　the　excellence　of　a　political　constitution　is　divided。　It　is　both　more　favourable　to　present　good　government；　and　promotes　a　better　and　higher　form　of　national　character；　than　any　other　polity　whatsoever。　　　Its　superiority　in　reference　to　present　well…being　rests　upon　two　principles；　of　as　universal　truth　and　applicability　as　any　general　propositions　which　can　be　laid　down　respecting　human　affairs。　The　first　is；　that　the　rights　and　interests　of　every　or　any　person　are　only　secure　from　being　disregarded　when　the　person　interested　is　himself　able；　and　habitually　disposed；　to　stand　up　for　them。　The　second　is；　that　the　general　prosperity　attains　a　greater　height；　and　is　more　widely　diffused；　in　proportion　to　the　amount　and　variety　of　the　personal　energies　enlisted　in　promoting　it。　　　Putting　these　two　propositions　into　a　shape　more　special　to　their　present　application；　human　beings　are　only　secure　from　evil　at　the　hands　of　others　in　proportion　as　they　have　the　power　of　being；　and　are；　self…protecting；　and　they　only　achieve　a　high　degree　of　success　in　their　struggle　with　Nature　in　proportion　as　they　are　self…dependent；　relying　on　what　they　themselves　can　do；　either　separately　or　in　concert；　rather　than　on　what　others　do　for　them。　　　The　former　proposition…　that　each　is　the　only　safe　guardian　of　his　own　rights　and　interests…　is　one　of　those　elementary　maxims　of　prudence；　which　every　person；　capable　of　conducting　his　own　affairs；　implicitly　acts　upon；　wherever　he　himself　is　interested。　Many；　indeed；　have　a　great　dislike　to　it　as　a　political　doctrine；　and　are　fond　of　holding　it　up　to　obloquy；　as　a　doctrine　of　universal　selfishness。　To　which　we　may　answer；　that　whenever　it　ceases　to　be　true　that　mankind