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appear to us to have crept into the political creed of the
Republic； purely from the struggles of faction。 When men have a
specific and important purpose in view； it is but natural they
should bend most of its collateral connections to the support of
their own objects。 We conceive that the Constitution has thus
been largely misinterpreted； and they who live at the epoch of
the renowned 〃equilibrium〃 and of the 〃rights of the people of
the Sovereign States；〃 will have seen memorable examples of the
truth of this position。
The first popular error； then； that we shall venture to assail；
is that connected with the prevalent notion of the sovereignty of
the States。 We do not believe that the several States of this
Union are； in any legitimate meaning of the term； sovereign at
all。 We are fully aware that this will be regarded as a bold； and
possibly as a presuming proposition； but we shall endeavor to
work it out with such means as we may have at command。
We lay down the following premises as too indisputable to need
any arguments to sustain them： viz。； the authority which formed
the present Constitution of the United States had the legal power
to do so。 That authority was in the Government of the States；
respectively； and not in their people in the popular
signification； but through their people in the political meaning
of the term； and what was then done must be regarded as acts
connected with the composition and nature of governments； and of
no minor or different interests of human affairs。
It being admitted； that the power which formed the government；
was legitimate； we obtain one of the purest compacts for the
organization of human society that probably ever existed。 The
ancient allegiance； under which the Colonies had grown up to
importance； had been extinguished by solemn treaty； and the
States met in Convention； sustained by all the law they had and
backed in every instance by institutions that were more or less
popular。 The history of the world cannot； probably； furnish
another instance of the settlement of the fundamental compact of
a great nation under circumstances of so much obvious justice。
This gives unusual solemnity and authority to the Constitution of
1787； and invests it with additional claims to our admiration and
respect。
The authority which formed the Constitution admitted； we come
next to the examination of its acts。 It is apparent from the
debates and proceedings of the Convention； that two opinions
existed in that body； the one leaning strongly toward the
concentration of power in the hands of the Federal Government；
and the other desirous of leaving as much as possible with the
respective States。 The principle that the powers which are not
directly conceded to the Union should remain in first hands；
would seem never to have been denied； and some years after the
organization of the Government； it was solemnly recognized in an
amendment。 We are not disposed； however； to look for arguments to
the debates and discussions of the Convention； in our view often
a deceptive and dangerous method of construing a law； since the
vote is very frequently given on even conflicting reasons。
Different minds arrive at the same results by different
processes； and it is no unusual thing for men to deny each
other's premises while they accept their conclusions。 We shall
look； therefore； solely to the compact itself； as the most
certain mode of ascertaining what was done。
No one will deny that all the great powers of sovereignty are
directly conceded to the Union。 The right to make war and peace；
to coin money； maintain armies and navies； &c。； &c。； in
themselves overshadow most of the sovereignty of the States。 The
amendatory clause would seem to annihilate it。 By the provisions
of that clause three fourths of the States can take away all the
powers and rights now resting in the hands of the respective
States； with a single exception。 This exception gives breadth and
emphasis to the efficiency of the clause。 It will be remembered
that all this can be done within the present Constitution。 It is
a part of the original bargain。 Thus； New York can legally be
deprived of the authority to punish for theft； to lay out
highways； to incorporate banks； and all the ordinary interests
over which she at present exercises control； every human being
within her limits dissenting。 Now as sovereignty means power in
the last resort； this amendatory clause most clearly deprives the
State of all sovereign power thus put at the disposition of
Conventions of the several States； in fact； the votes of these
Conventions； or that of the respective legislatures acting in the
same capacity； is nothing but the highest species of legislation
known to the country； and no other mode of altering the
institutions would be legal。 It follows unavoidably； we repeat；
that the sovereignty which remains in the several States must be
looked for solely in the exception。 What then is this exception？
It is a provision which says； that no State may be deprived of
its equal representation in the Senate； without its own consent。
It might well be questioned whether this provision of the
Constitution renders a Senate indispensable to the Government。
But we are willing to concede this point and admit that it does。
Can the vote of a single State； which is one of a body of thirty；
and which is bound to submit to the decision of a legal majority；
be deemed a sovereign vote？ Assuming that the whole power of the
Government of the United States were in the Senate； would any one
State be sovereign in such a condition of things？ We think not。
But the Senate does not constitute by any means the whole or the
half of the authority of this Government； its legislative power
is divided with a popular body； without the concurrence of which
it can do nothing； this dilutes the sovereignty to a degree that
renders it very imperceptible； if not very absurd。 Nor is this
all。 After a law is passed by the concurrence of the two houses
of Congress it is sent to a perfectly independent tribunal to
decide whether it is in conformity with the principles of the
great national compact； thus demonstrating； as we assume； that
the sovereignty of this whole country rests； not in its people；
not in its States； but in the Government of the Union。
Sovereignty； and that of the most absolute character； is
indispensable to the right of secession： Nay； sovereignty； in the
ordinary acceptation of the meaning of the term； might exist in a
State without this right of secession。 We doubt if it would be
held sound doctrine to maintain that any single State had a right
to secede from the German Confederation； for instance； and many
alliances； or mere treaties； are held to be sacred and
indissoluble； they are only broken by an appeal to violence。
Every human contract may be said to possess its distinctive
character。 Thus； marriage is to be distinguished from a
partnership in trade； without recurrence to any particular form
of words。 Marriage； contracted by any ceremony whatever； is held
to be a contract for life。 The same is true of governments： in
their nature they are intended to be indissoluble。 We doubt if
there be an instance on record of a government that ever existed；
under conditions； expressed or implied； that the parts of its
territory might separate at will。 There are so many controlling
and obvious reasons why such a privilege should not remain in the
hands of sections or districts； that it is unnecessary to advert
to them。 But after a country has rounded its territory；
constructed its lines of defence； established its system of
custom…houses； and made all the other provisions for security；
convenience； and concentration； that are necessary to the affairs
of a great nation； it would seem to be very presumptuous to
impute to any particular district the right to destroy or
mutilate a system regulated with so much c