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which maintained a family。 In some places it is so at this day；
nor will money at present purchase a greater quantity of
commodities there than in other places。 In a country where the
surplus produce of a large estate must be consumed upon the
estate itself； it will frequently be more convenient for the
proprietor that part of it be consumed at a distance from his own
house provided they who consume it are as dependent upon him as
either his retainers or his menial servants。 He is thereby saved
from the embarrassment of either too large a company or too large
a family。 A tenant at will； who possesses land sufficient to
maintain his family for little more than a quit…rent； is as
dependent upon the proprietor as any servant or retainer whatever
and must obey him with as little reserve。 Such a proprietor； as
he feeds his servants and retainers at his own house； so he feeds
his tenants at their houses。 The subsistence of both is derived
from his bounty； and its continuance depends upon his good
pleasure。
Upon the authority which the great proprietor necessarily
had in such a state of things over their tenants and retainers
was founded the power of the ancient barons。 They necessarily
became the judges in peace； and the leaders in war； of all who
dwelt upon their estates。 They could maintain order and execute
the law within their respective demesnes； because each of them
could there turn the whole force of all the inhabitants against
the injustice of any one。 No other persons had sufficient
authority to do this。 The king in particular had not。 In those
ancient times he was little more than the greatest proprietor in
his dominions； to whom； for the sake of common defence against
their common enemies； the other great proprietors paid certain
respects。 To have enforced payment of a small debt within the
lands of a great proprietor； where all the inhabitants were armed
and accustomed to stand by one another； would have cost the king；
had he attempted it by his own authority； almost the same effort
as to extinguish a civil war。 He was； therefore； obliged to
abandon the administration of justice through the greater part of
the country to those who were capable of administering it； and
for the same reason to leave the command of the country militia
to those whom that militia would obey。
It is a mistake to imagine that those territorial
jurisdictions took their origin from the feudal law。 Not only the
highest jurisdictions both civil and criminal； but the power of
levying troops； of coining money； and even that of making
bye…laws for the government of their own people； were all rights
possessed allodially by the great proprietors of land several
centuries before even the name of the feudal law was known in
Europe。 The authority and jurisdiction of the Saxon lords in
England appear to have been as great before the Conquest as that
of any of the Norman lords after it。 But the feudal law is not
supposed to have become the common law of England till after the
Conquest。 That the most extensive authority and jurisdictions
were possessed by the great lords in France allodially long
before the feudal law was introduced into that country is a
matter of fact that admits of no doubt。 That authority and those
jurisdictions all necessarily flowed from the state of property
and manners just now described。 Without remounting to the remote
antiquities of either the French or English monarchies； we may
find in much later times many proofs that such effects must
always flow from such causes。 It is not thirty years ago since
Mr。 Cameron of Lochiel； a gentleman of Lochabar in Scotland；
without any legal warrant whatever； not being what was then
called a lord of regality； nor even a tenant in chief； but a
vassal of the Duke of Argyle； and without being so much as a
justice of peace； used； notwithstanding； to exercise the highest
criminal jurisdiction over his own people。 He is said to have
done so with great equity； though without any of the formalities
of justice； and it is not improbable that the state of that part
of the country at that time made it necessary for him to assume
this authority in order to maintain the public peace。 That
gentleman； whose rent never exceeded five hundred pounds a year；
carried； in 1745； eight hundred of his own people into the
rebellion with him。
The introduction of the feudal law； so far from extending；
may be regarded as an attempt to moderate the authority of the
great allodial lords。 It established a regular subordination；
accompanied with a long train of services and duties； from the
king down to the smallest proprietor。 During the minority of the
proprietor； the rent； together with the management of his lands；
fell into the hands of his immediate superior； and； consequently；
those of all great proprietors into the hands of the king； who
was charged with the maintenance and education of the pupil； and
who； from his authority as guardian； was supposed to have a right
of disposing of him in marriage； provided it was in a manner not
unsuitable to his rank。 But though this institution necessarily
tended to strengthen the authority of the king； and to weaken
that of the great proprietors； it could not do either
sufficiently for establishing order and good government among the
inhabitants of the country； because it could not alter
sufficiently that state of property and manners from which the
disorders arose。 The authority of government still continued to
be； as before； too weak in the head and too strong in the
inferior members； and the excessive strength of the inferior
members was the cause of the weakness of the head。 After the
institution of feudal subordination； the king was as incapable of
restraining the violence of the great lords as before。 They still
continued to make war according to their own discretion； almost
continually upon one another； and very frequently upon the king；
and the open country still continued to be a scene of violence；
rapine； and disorder。
But what all the violence of the feudal institutions could
never have effected； the silent and insensible operation of
foreign commerce and manufactures gradually brought about。 These
gradually furnished the great proprietors with something for
which they could exchange the whole surplus produce of their
lands； and which they could consume themselves without sharing it
either with tenants or retainers。 All for ourselves and nothing
for other people； seems； in every age of the world； to have been
the vile maxim of the masters of mankind。 As soon； therefore； as
they could find a method of consuming the whole value of their
rents themselves； they had no disposition to share them with any
other persons。 For a pair of diamond buckles； perhaps； or for
something as frivolous and useless； they exchanged the
maintenance； or what is the same thing； the price of the
maintenance of a thousand men for a year； and with it the whole
weight and authority which it could give them。 The buckles；
however； were to be all their own； and no other human creature
was to have any share of them； whereas in the more ancient method
of expense they must have shared with at least a thousand people。
With the judges that were to determine the preference this
difference was perfectly decisive； and thus； for the
gratification of the most childish； the meanest； and the most
sordid of all vanities； they gradually bartered their whole power
and authority。
In a country where there is no foreign commerce； nor any of
the finer manufactures； a man of ten thousand a year cannot well
employ his revenue in any other way than in maintaining； perhaps；
a thousand families； who are all of them necessarily at his
command。 In the present state of Europe； a man of ten thousand a
year can spend his whole revenue； and he generally does so；
without directly maintaining twenty people； or being able to
command more than ten footmen not worth the commanding。
Indirectly； perhaps； he maintains as great or even a greater
number of people than he c