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Theaet。 True。
Str。 And say that things are real of you which are not； for； as we
were saying； in regard to each thing or person； there is much that
is and much that is not。
Theaet。 Quite true。
Str。 The second of the two sentences which related to you was
first of all an example of the shortest form consistent with our
definition。
Theaet。 Yes； this was implied in recent admission。
Str。 And； in the second place； it related to a subject？
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 Who must be you； and can be nobody else？
Theaet。 Unquestionably。
Str。 And it would be no sentence at all if there were no subject；
for； as we proved； a sentence which has no subject is impossible。
Theaet。 Quite true。
Str。 When other； then； is asserted of you as the same； and
not…being
as being； such a combination of nouns and verbs is really and truly
false discourse。
Theaet。 Most true。
Str。 And therefore thought； opinion； and imagination are now
proved to exist in our minds both as true and false。
Theaet。 How so？
Str。 You will know better if you first gain a knowledge of
what they
are； and in what they severally differ from one another。
Theaet。 Give me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain。
Str。 Are not thought and speech the same； with this exception；
that what is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the
soul with herself？
Theaet。 Quite true。
Str。 But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is
audible is called speech？
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And we know that there exists in speech。。。
Theaet。 What exists？
Str。 Affirmation。
Theaet。 Yes； we know it。
Str。 When the affirmation or denial takes Place in silence and in
the mind only； have you any other name by which to call it but
opinion？
Theaet。 There can be no other name。
Str。 And when opinion is presented； not simply； but in some form
of sense； would you not call it imagination？
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 And seeing that language is true and false； and that
thought is
the conversation of the soul with herself； and opinion is the end of
thinking； and imagination or phantasy is the union of sense and
opinion； the inference is that some of them； since they are akin to
language； should have an element of falsehood as well as of truth？
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 Do you perceive； then； that false opinion and speech have
been discovered sooner than we expected？…For just now we seemed to
be undertaking a task which would never be accomplished。
Theaet。 I perceive。
Str。 Then let us not be discouraged about the future； but
now having
made this discovery； let us go back to our previous classification。
Theaet。 What classification？
Str。 We divided image…making into two sorts； the one
likeness…making； the other imaginative or phantastic。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And we said that we were uncertain in which we should
place the
Sophist。
Theaet。 We did say so。
Str。 And our heads began to go round more and more when it was
asserted that there is no such thing as an image or idol or
appearance； because in no manner or time or place can there ever be
such a thing as falsehood。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And now； since there has been shown to be false speech and
false opinion； there may be imitations of real existences； and out
of this condition of the mind an art of deception may arise。
Theaet。 Quite possible。
Str。 And we have： already admitted； in what preceded； that the
Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness…making
art？
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 Let us； then； renew the attempt； and in dividing any class；
always take the part to the right； holding fast to that which holds
the Sophist； until we have stripped him of all his common
properties； and reached his difference or peculiar。 Then we may
exhibit him in his true nature； first to ourselves and then
to kindred
dialectical spirits。
Theaet。 Very good。
Str。 You may remember that all art was originally divided
by us into
creative and acquisitive。
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 And the Sophist was flitting before us in the acquisitive
class； in the subdivisions of hunting； contests； merchandise； and
the like。
Theaet。 Very true。
Str。 But now that the imitative art has enclosed him； it is clear
that we must begin by dividing the art of creation； for
imitation is a
kind of creation of images； however； as we affirm； and not of real
things。
Theaet。 Quite true。
Str。 In the first place； there are two kinds of creation。
Theaet。 What are they？
Str。 One of them is human and the other divine。
Theaet。 I do not follow。
Str。 Every power； as you may remember our saying originally； which
causes things to exist； not previously existing； was defined by us
as creative。
Theaet。 I remember。
Str。 Looking； now； at the world and all the animals and plants； at
things which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots； as well as at
inanimate substances which are formed within the earth； fusile or
non…fusile； shall we say that they come into existence…not having
existed previously…by the creation of God； or shall we agree with
vulgar opinion about them？
Theaet。 What is it？
Str。 The opinion that nature brings them into being from some
spontaneous and unintelligent cause。 Or shall we say that they are
created by a divine reason and a knowledge which comes from God？
Theaet。 I dare say that； owing to my youth； I may often waver in
my view； but now when I look at you and see that you incline to
refer them to God； I defer to your authority。
Str。 Nobly said； Theaetetus； and if I thought that you were one of
those who would hereafter change your mind； I would have
gently argued
with you； and forced you to assent； but as I perceive that you will
come of yourself and without any argument of mine； to that belief
which； as you say； attracts you； I will not forestall the work of
time。 Let me suppose then； that things which are said to be made by
nature are the work of divine art； and that things which are made by
man out of these are work of human art。 And so there are two kinds
of making and production； the one human and the other divine。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 Then； now； subdivide each of the two sections which we have
already。
Theaet。 How do you mean？
Str。 I mean to say that you should make a vertical division of
production or invention； as you have already made a lateral one。
Theaet。 I have done so。
Str。 Then； now； there are in all four parts or segments…two of
them have reference to us and are human； and two of them have
reference to the gods and are divine。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And； again； in the division which was supposed to be made in
the other way； one part in each subdivision is the making of the
things themselves； but the two remaining parts may be called the
making of likenesses； and so the productive art is again divided
into two parts。
Theaet。 Tell me the divisions once more。
Str。 I suppose that we； and the other animals； and the elements
out of which things are made…fire； water； and the like…are
known by us
to be each and all the creation and work of God。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And there are images of them； which are not them； but which
correspond to them； and these are also the creation of a wonderful
skill。
Theaet。 What are they？
Str。 The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by
day； such as a shadow when darkness arises in a fire； or the
reflection which is produced when the light in bright and smooth
objects meets on their surface with an external light； and creates a
perception the opposite of our ordinary sight。
Theaet。 Yes； and the images as well as the creation are equally
the work of a divine hand。
Str。 And what shall we say of human art？ Do we not make
one house by
the art of building； and another by the art of drawing； which is a
sort of dream created by man for those who are awake？
Theaet。 Quite true。
Str。 And other products of human creation are twofold and go in
pairs； there is the thing； with which