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circumstances？
Theaet。 Yes； they do。
Str。 But surely that which may be present or may be absent will be
admitted by them to exist？
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 And； allowing that justice； wisdom； the other virtues； and
their opposites exist； as well as a soul in which they
inhere； do they
affirm any of them to be visible and tangible； or are they all
invisible？
Theaet。 They would say that hardly any of them are visible。
Str。 And would they say that they are corporeal？
Theaet。 They would distinguish： the soul would be said by them to
have a body； but as to the other qualities of justice；
wisdom； and the
like； about which you asked； they would not venture either to deny
their existence； or to maintain that they were all corporeal。
Str。 Verily； Theaetetus； I perceive a great improvement in
them； the
real aborigines； children of the dragon's teeth； would have been
deterred by no shame at all； but would have obstinately asserted
that nothing is which they are not able to squeeze in their hands。
Theaet。 That is pretty much their notion。
Str。 Let us push the question； for if they will admit that
any； even
the smallest particle of being； is incorporeal； it is enough； they
must then say what that nature is which is common to both the
corporeal and incorporeal； and which they have in their mind's eye
when they say of both of them that they 〃are。〃 Perhaps they may be
in a difficulty； and if this is the case； there is a possibility
that they may accept a notion of ours respecting the nature of
being； having nothing of their own to offer。
Theaet。 What is the notion？ Tell me； and we shall soon see。
Str。 My notion would be； that anything which possesses any sort of
power to affect another； or to be affected by another； if only for a
single moment； however trifling the cause and however slight the
effect； has real existence； and I hold that the definition
of being is
simply power of
Theaet。 They accept your suggestion； having nothing better of
their own to offer。
Str。 Very good； perhaps we； as well as they； may one day change
our minds； but； for the present； this may be regarded as the
understanding which is established with them。
Theaet。 Agreed。
Str。 Let us now go to the friends of ideas； of their opinions；
too； you shall be the interpreter。
Theaet。 I will。
Str。 To them we say…You would distinguish essence from generation？
Theaet。 〃Yes；〃 they reply。
Str。 And you would allow that we participate in
generation； with the
body； and through perception； but we participate with the
soul through
in true essence； and essence you would affirm to be always the same
and immutable； whereas generation or becoming varies？
Theaet。 Yes； that is what we should affirm。
Str。 Well； fair sirs； we say to them； what is this participation；
which you assert of both？ Do you agree with our recent definition？
Theaet。 What definition？
Str。 We said that being was an active or passive energy；
arising out
of a certain power which proceeds from elements meeting with one
another。 Perhaps your cars； Theaetetus； may fail to catch their
answer； which I recognize because I have been accustomed to hear it。
Theaet。 And what is their answer？
Str。 They deny the truth of what we were just now； saying to the
aborigines about existence。
Theaet。 What was that？
Str。 Any power of doing or suffering in a degree however slight
was held by us to be a sufficient definition of being？
Theaet。 True。
Str。 They deny this； and say that the power of doing or
suffering is
confined to becoming； and that neither power is applicable to being。
Theaet。 And is there not some truth in what they say？
Str。 Yes； but our reply will be that we want to ascertain from
them more distinctly； whether they further admit that the soul
knows； and that being or essence is known。
Theaet。 There can be no doubt that they say so。
Str。 And is knowing and being known； doing or suffering；
or both； or
is the one doing and the other suffering； or has neither any share
in either？
Theaet。 Clearly； neither has any share in either； for if they say
anything else； they will contradict themselves。
Str。 I understand； but they will allow that if to know is active；
then； of course； to be known is passive。 And on this view
being； in so
far as it is known； is acted upon by knowledge； and is therefore in
motion； for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon；
as we affirm。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And； O heavens； can we ever be made to believe that motion
and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being？ Can
we imagine that； being is devoid of life and mind； and
exists in awful
unmeaningness an everlasting fixture？
Theaet。 That would be a dreadful thing to admit； Stranger。
Str。 But shall we say that has mind and not life？
Theaet。 How is that possible？
Str。 Or shall we say that both inhere in perfect being； but that
it has no soul which contains them？
Theaet。 And in what other way can it contain them？
Str。 Or that being has mind and life and soul； but although
endowed with soul remains absolutely unmoved？
Theaet。 All three suppositions appear to me to be irrational。
Str。 Under being； then； we must include motion； and that which is
moved。
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 Then； Theaetetus； our inference is； that if there is
no motion；
neither is there any mind anywhere； or about anything or belonging
to any one。
Theaet。 Quite true。
Str。 And yet this equally follows； if we grant that all things are
in motion…upon this view too mind has no existence。
Theaet。 How so？
Str。 Do you think that sameness of condition and mode and subject
could ever exist without a principle of rest？
Theaet。 Certainly not。
Str。 Can you see how without them mind could exist； or come into
existence anywhere？
Theaet。 No。
Str。 And surely contend we must in every possible way against him
who would annihilate knowledge and reason and mind； and yet ventures
to speak confidently about anything。
Theaet。 Yes； with all our might。
Str。 Then the philosopher； who has the truest reverence for these
qualities； cannot possibly accept the notion of those who
say that the
whole is at rest； either as unity or in many forms： and he will be
utterly deaf to those who assert universal motion。 As children say
entreatingly 〃Give us both。〃 so he will include both the moveable
and immoveable in his definition of being and all。
Theaet。 Most true。
Str。 And now； do we seem to have gained a fair notion of being？
Theaet。 Yes truly。
Str。 Alas； Theaetetus； methinks that we are now only beginning to
see the real difficulty of the enquiry into the nature of it。
Theaet。 What do you mean？
Str。 O my friend； do you not see that nothing can exceed out
ignorance； and yet we fancy that we are saying something good？
Theaet。 I certainly thought that we were； and I do not at all
understand how we never found out our desperate case。
Str。 Reflect： after having made； these admissions； may we not be
justly asked； the same questions which we ourselves were asking of
those who said that all was hot and cold？
Theaet。 What were they？ Will you recall them to my mind？
Str。 To be sure； I will remind you of them； by putting the same
questions； to you which I did to them； and then we shall get on。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire
opposition to one another？
Theaet。 Of course。
Str。 And yet you would say that both and either of them
equally are？
Theaet。 I should。
Str。 And when you admit that both or either of them are；
do you mean
to say that both or either； of them are in motion？
Theaet。 Certainly not。
Str。 Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest； when you
say that they are？
Theaet。 Of course not。
Str。 Then you conceive of being as some third and distinct nature；
under which rest and motion are alike included； and； observing that
they both participate in being； you declare that they